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Abstract
This study examines the price reaction to the announcements of joint venture and strategic
alliance formation, the main determinants of the partnering firm’s choices to enter a specific joint
venture and a specific strategic alliance, and the impact of such alliance formation on partnering
firms’ valuation. The analysis of the price reaction at the announcement of alliance formation
indicates that market can distinguish between value creating and non-value creating alliances. I
also provide evidence supporting the argument that alliance formation is not a random process. A
firm’s choice of entering an alliance designed as diversifying or non-diversifying strategy is a
result of a complex interaction of external factors and internal needs. Finally, using the change in
excess value from the year prior to the year following the alliance formation, I document that
alliance formation negatively impacts the valuation of the single segment partnering firms
relative to their industry peers, and has no impact on the valuation of multiple segment firms.
Thus, single segment firms entering alliances are facing the trade-off between the long-term
benefit provided by the alliance and the immediate costs affecting the activity developed in the
house.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade joint ventures and strategic alliances have become prevalent in the
business environment, both domestic and international. Alliances are “less-than-arm’s-length”
relationships that facilitate the merging of complementary interests, the sharing of privileged
information, and intimate cooperation and collaboration between independent firms. The
increasing importance of joint ventures and strategic alliances is also reflected by the attention
received in strategic management and business policy theory, as well as in other research
disciplines such as (industrial) economics, organization theory, marketing, and finance.
Analysis of wealth effects around joint ventures provides insight into the broader impact
of diversification on firm value1. There is a general consensus that market reaction upon alliance
announcements reflects investors’ perception that joint ventures, as hybrid corporate governance
mechanisms, are value creating. Empirical studies, including McConell and Nantell (1985), Koh
and Venkatraman (1991), Balakrishnan and Koza (1993), Mohanram and Nanda (1998), and
Johnson and Huston (2000) show that partner firms on average earn positive and significant
abnormal returns when joint ventures are announced, in spite of a high cross-sectional variation.
In this study, I find evidence consistent with these studies, and I suggest that the cross-sectional
variation in the stock market reaction is partially explained by different market perceptions
regarding diversifying versus non-diversifying joint ventures. I classify a joint venture as a
diversifying strategy whenever its primary SIC code is not shared by any of the business
1

Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Chevalier (2000), among others, provide
evidence on market reaction at the announcements of diversifying mergers. For market reactions at the
announcements of nondiversifying corporate events, see John and Ofek (1995), Desai and Jain (1999),
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Dittmar and Shivdashani (2003)
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segments of the partnering firms; a non-diversifying joint venture has a primary four-digit SIC
code shared by at least one of the partnering firms’ business segments. Based on market reaction
at the announcement of joint ventures, I argue that non-diversifying joint ventures are value
increasing, whereas diversifying joint ventures do not create value.
The second issue I address in this study has to do with the factors that help explain a
firm’s choice between a diversifying or non-diversifying joint venture. For a sample of firms
that have undertaken non-diversifying joint ventures, I analyze the degree of overlap between the
alliance activity and one or more of the existing business segments of the parent firms. Thus, I
incorporate in my analysis not only the main factors of joint venture formation that have received
attention in the alliance literature but also determinants at the division level. Such analysis is
motivated by Khanna’s (1998) argument that the missing link in understanding why alliances are
very difficult to manage and at the same time increasingly popular is the interaction between the
alliance activity and the concurrent activities not governed by the alliance:
“The individual alliance is thus very much embedded in the broader set of activities pursued by
the firm (which determine private benefits), an observation similar to Madhok and Tallman’s
(1998) suggestion that the particular resource that forms the basis of the transaction for the
alliance is just part of a broader set of resources available to the partnering firms.”
I find that non-diversifying joint ventures are more likely to be formed by firms operating in

highly competitive industries and during economic downturns. Such joint ventures are also more
likely to be designed as strategies for complex joint ventures. Further, I document that younger
firms and firms with higher growth opportunities are forming joint ventures having a high
overlap with the activities developed in the house.
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Using a sample spanning 1991-1996, I analyze whether joint venture formation favorably
affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry counterparts. I use Berger and
Ofek’s (1995) excess value measure of firm value, and test whether there is a significant change
in excess value from the year before to the year after alliance formation. I find that joint venture
formation negatively affects the valuation of single segment firms relative to their industry
counterparts, while impact on multiple segment firms is statistically insignificant. For the subsample of multiple segment firms, I also document an insignificant impact of joint venture
formation on the investment efficiency and capital allocation.
The market for external capital is very susceptible to the vagaries of economic conditions,
and firms may have to fall back on their internal capital markets in order to realize their
investments. Strategic investments like joint ventures, while arms-length contracts, may still
have a large impact on internal capital markets as they relocate capital away from internal
investment opportunities. Thus, while not explicitly diversifying, joint ventures can implicitly
diversify the capital needs of the partner firms and may therefore have the same impact on firm
value as explicit diversification strategies.
I follow up with a similar analysis for strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are informal
and formal agreements between two or more firms that agree to cooperate in some form of a
relationship. Several differences between joint ventures and strategic alliances motivate a
separate analysis of strategic alliances on firm valuation. First, as documented in the literature,
the initial investment required for the formation of a strategic alliance is, on average, rather small
compared to the investment necessary for the formation of a joint venture. It is also more
difficult to measure each partner’s contribution throughout the life of a strategic alliance, and
therefore more difficult to allocate the benefits obtained from such an alliance. Hence strategic
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alliances, as evolving relationships, are less formal and more ambiguous. Due to this
organizational flexibility, the creation of a strategic alliance may in fact add more value to the
partner firms than a joint venture. I study the market reaction at the announcement of strategic
alliances and find that the wealth creation around the announcement of strategic alliances is
primarily confined to the sub-samples of non-diversifying and technological strategic alliances.
I follow up with the analysis of the main determinants of a firm’s choice of forming a
diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliance. As Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2003)
note, strategic alliances involve the development of new growth opportunities that will enhance
existing core capabilities. Throughout the life of a strategic alliance there is a continuous
integration between the existing activities and the evolving redefinition of the firm’s capabilities
and resources. My analysis indicates that strategic alliances have a short-term negative impact on
the valuation of the partnering firms, and this effect is mostly confined to the sub-sample of
single segment firms.
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the
extant theoretical and empirical literature on alliances and internal capital allocation around
various corporate events. In Chapter 3, I present my testable hypotheses for the sample of joint
ventures, define the variables I use to test these hypotheses, and present the methodology. I also
present the results of the empirical analyses and the conclusions derived. In Chapter 4, I describe
the strategic alliances sample selection criteria, and the testable hypotheses. This chapter also
details the methodology, and variables utilized to test the hypotheses. Finally, I present the
results and the conclusions derived. A summary of the main findings concludes the study.

5

2. Literature Review
2.1. Alliances
2.1.1. Streams of research
Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2000) identify three streams of research emerging from the
academic work on business alliances. The first stream focuses on the motivations for alliance
formation and includes three rationales: strategic, transaction cost related, and learning related.
The second stream examines the choice of governance structure in alliances, while the third one
is primarily concerned with the effectiveness and performance of the alliances.
Within the literature on the motives for alliance formation, strategic considerations have
been mainly discussed in resource-based theories of strategic management. The resource-based
approach is concerned with the management of a firm’s resources in a manner that increases the
competitive advantage and consequent rents that can be obtained from such resources (Peteraf,
1993). First, an alliance provides a way to appropriate scarce resources when the firm lacks the
capability to develop them in-house or when the development of such capabilities is subject to
diseconomies of scale, scope, and time as compared to firms that already possess them (Deeds
and Hill, 1996). Second, an alliance may provide the necessary mechanism for facilitating
exchange of resources, such as rapid product development and flexible innovation capabilities,
which are distributed throughout and embedded within the firm itself. Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven (1996) identify two factors that influence alliance formation. First, firms are more
likely to form alliances if they are in a vulnerable strategic position and need additional
resources. They measure strategic position using the number of competitors, the stage of market
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development, and the strategy of the firm. Second, alliance formation is more likely when firms
are in strong social positions with a large, experienced and well-connected team management.
Transaction costs provide another rationale for alliance formation and are mainly
concerned with the management of transactions in an efficient manner through the least cost
form of governance, under the assumption of potential opportunism (Williamson (1985, 1991)).
While the early literature on transaction costs was mainly restricted to the choice between
markets and hierarchies, later work has extended the analysis by incorporating the choice
between intermediate forms of governance. Hennart (1993), however, points out that it is
important to distinguish between methods of organization (price system and hierarchy) and
economic institutions (market and firms), as there is no one-to-one correspondence between the
two. Prices and “hierarchy” are methods used to organize economic activities, while markets and
firms are institutions that use one or both methods to achieve that goal.
Learning explanations view alliances as a way to accessing and acquiring critical skills or
capabilities from alliance partners. Increased attention paid to the learning motive has led to the
identification of several factors affecting the learning process and learning success. Kogut (1988)
argues that both equity-based alliances and non-equity contractual agreements facilitate the
transfer of tacit know-how and capabilities, while Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996) state
that equity based governance structures are better suited for learning critical know-how or
capabilities.
The second stream of research on alliances focuses on the choice of governance structure.
The main argument is that opportunistic behavior is more likely to emerge in an uncertain assetspecific transaction. Therefore, hierarchical mechanisms may restrict opportunism by replacing
market mechanisms in organizing a transaction. This argument is central to studies on the choice
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between equity-based arrangements conceived as quasi-hierarchies and non-equity arrangements
conceived as quasi-markets. According to Williamson (1983), joint ownership better aligns the
incentives of both parent firms as shared equity represents an exchange of hostages between
parties. Osborn and Baughn (1990) analyze the relationship between the technology life cycle
and governance in alliances. Their argument is that early in the technology life cycle, firms
might prefer the flexibility of contractual arrangements. Later in the technology life cycle, firms
might quasi-internalize the benefits of the cooperation through joint venture arrangements.
Madhok and Tallman (1998) argue that governance modes differ in their potential for value
creation, where value for the firm can be in the leveraging of internal resources or in the learning
of new capabilities.
Performance and effectiveness of the alliances represent the third stream of research in
the alliance literature. The evidence that has been provided so far is not only limited but also
contradictory. Several problems are encountered when attempting to measure the performance of
business alliances. Alliance success can be measured on the project, the relationship, or on the
firm level. Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) point out that while success may be revealed on one
level of analysis, results on other levels might reveal the opposite.
Early studies on alliance performance used longevity as an indicator of success of the
alliance. However, more recent studies point out that an alliance that has reached its strategic
objectives sooner than initially estimated should be considered a success rather than a failure
(Gulati, 1998). Another measure of alliance effectiveness is the partners’ level of satisfaction
with the alliance results. Khanna, et al. (1998) argue that the employment of this indicator might
be problematic as the level of satisfaction may be asymmetric with one party considering the
alliance successful while the other partner perceives the alliance unsuccessful. Using a sample of
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joint venture announcements from 1986 to 1993, Mohanram and Nanda (1998) find that joint
ventures tend to be announced when the parent firms’ performance is deteriorating, when firms
are underperforming in the stock market, or when there is a decline in accounting performance.
Market participants’ perception about the effectiveness of joint ventures is partially
embedded in price movements at the time of such announcements. The evidence provided by
empirical studies on the market reaction at the announcements of joint ventures supports the
argument that alliances are value creating corporate events. The next section summarizes some
of the relevant studies on this area of research.
2.1.2. Value gains at the announcements of joint ventures formation
McConnell and Nantell (1985) investigated the stock returns of US firms that participated
in domestic joint ventures from 1972 to 1979. Using a sample of 136 joint ventures involving
210 firms from different industries, they found that joint venture announcements were, on
average, wealth creating for the shareholders of the participating firms. McConnell and Nantell
pointed out that the wealth gains from mergers and tender offers could be either from synergy
gains that arise from the alliances or possibly from the displacement of less-effective
management. However, as the management of the partner firms remains intact after a joint
venture has been formed, McConnell and Nantell observed that the most likely source of the
wealth gains from joint ventures is the synergy hypothesis.
Using a sample of 239 US firms involved in 175 joint ventures and spanning the years
from 1972 to 1986, Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examined the market value impact of domestic
joint ventures in the information technology sector. Their results indicate that joint ventures have
a greater impact on market value than technology exchanges between firms. They also observed
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that marketing alliances, supply agreements, and licensing agreements had no significant impact
on market value of firms.
Further analysis of the market reaction indicates that joint ventures that strengthen
existing product-market segments or place new products in existing markets are met with
significant and positive market reactions, while alliances that develop new customers or enter
unrelated product-market segments create no such effects. Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) found
that joint venture announcements, for 64 joint ventures spanning 1974-1977, had a lower impact
when parent companies were engaged in businesses that were further apart in a technological and
managerial sense.
Madhavan and Prescott (1995) analyzed the market reaction at the announcements of
joint ventures in different industries. Their sample covered 108 joint ventures over the period
1978-1991. Madhavan and Prescott defined the industry information-processing load as the
standard deviation among earnings forecasts made by institutional brokers and found that there
was a U-shaped relationship between the degree of information processing required for an
investment analyst to understand a joint venture and the venture’s perceived impact on parent
firms’ market value. Johnson and Huston (2000) extended the analysis of market reaction to the
announcements of domestic joint ventures by differentiating between horizontal and vertical
joint ventures. Their results indicate that partners forming horizontal joint ventures share
synergistic gain, while for vertical joint ventures the gain accrues only for suppliers.
2.2. Internal Capital Allocation
2.2.1. Theoretical work
The problem of capital allocation has received widespread attention in the academic
world. Two interrelated streams of literature have emerged. The first stream of literature focuses
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on the external capital market (the allocation of financing among firms), and the second mainly
focuses on allocation of capital within individual firms (internal capital market).
According to Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), internal capital markets provide the
capital supplier (corporate headquarters) with total and unconditional control rights; this is
because the headquarters own the business unit to which capital is allocated. As a consequence,
internal capital markets present the advantages of improved monitoring and free asset
redeployability. The cost of internal capital allocation is mainly the reduction in unit managers’
entrepreneurial incentives as to the use of such funds. Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein analyze
monitoring and entrepreneurial incentives under the assumption that the central headquarters
oversee only one division. Analysis of asset redeployability is undertaken assuming that the
headquarters finance multiple related business projects. This study constitutes the starting point
on the analysis of the authority to reallocate funds within a firm.
Stein (1997) builds on the evidence developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990) and argues that the authority to redistribute resources across projects, each
with its own managers, distinguishes headquarters from an equally well-informed external
provider of capital, such as a bank. Under a two-layer hierarchy, an empire-building manager can
create value by shifting funds from the “losers” to the “winners” in so-called “winner-picking”
activities. However, Stein does not incorporate any agency problem, as the divisional managers
are considered passive.
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) provide another perspective to the “winner-picking” benefit
of integration. In their model, internal capital markets have greater flexibility to redistribute
funds because they more often bypass the friction associated with external financing. However,
the flexibility created by internal capital markets may also result in two costly effects: i) strategic
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disadvantages may be created in product market competition (vulnerability to entry threat) and,
(ii) the need for external financing may be reduced, thus increasing the extent to which managers
may engage in overinvestment activities.
As opposed to the winner picking models, recent theoretical research argues that internal
capital markets can lead to inefficient capital allocation to individual projects or divisions.
According to these studies, the central problem associated with internal capital markets is the
agency conflict between the CEO and divisional managers.
Following Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts’ (1992) study on influence activities,
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) analyze two divisional managers’ investment decisions when the
managers may invest either in a value maximizing project or in a project that increases the
managers’ utility but does not improve the firm value. The only link between the two divisions is
through the firm’s aggregate budget constraint, so that resources not invested in one division
must be allocated to the other. By incorporating two levels of agency with three basic agents
(division managers, a CEO, and outside investors), Scharfstein and Stein not only capture
divisional rent-seeking behavior but also show that the CEO’s misaligned incentives are reflected
in the allocation of investment. Unlike a principal, the CEO acting as an agent perceives
distorted capital allocation as being less costly than additional cash compensation to divisional
managers. Therefore, headquarters tilt the capital budget towards the weaker division so as to
mitigate the agency problem with divisional managers. In particular, the division with the weaker
investment will get more ‘extra’ resources than the division with the better investment because
this makes the weaker division act more cooperatively in joint production with other divisions
(“corporate socialism”).
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Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) address the same problem of corporate socialism,
but in their model the CEO acts on behalf of the shareholders, and the only agency conflict is
between the CEO and divisional managers. These authors model two divisions that can each
invest in either a “defensive” (bad) project or an “efficient” (good) project. The defensive project
does not maximize NPV of the firm but protects the divisions’ assets from poaching by other
divisions. The CEO’s transfer of funds from the divisions with the best investment to the
divisions with the worst is consequently designed to prevent the occurrence of conditions under
which individual divisions will prefer to invest in the defensive project.
Aside from the direct effect on the ex-post investment efficiency, the authority to
reallocate funds from one project to the other has other effects. In Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts
(1992), there are no investment inefficiencies; the only distortions being the wasteful activities of
divisional managers so as to obtain a larger share of the capital budget. Meyer, Milgrom, and
Roberts predict that such distortionary behavior is more of a problem in divisions with poor
prospects and suggest that the firm may be better off divesting such divisions.
Along the same lines, Brusco and Panunzi (2000) argue that even when resources are (ex
post) optimally allocated, the possibility of winner picking reduces managerial incentives exante. Hence, the redistribution leads to two opposing effects: it creates value and, at the same
time, rent for the manager of the ex-post less profitable division is reduced.

Brusco and

Panunzi’s analysis is built on the assumptions that divisional managers always choose effort
independently from each other and that the value of the multi-divisional firm is independent of
the ex-ante differences across divisions.
Gautier and Heider (2002) build on the model developed by Stein (1997) by introducing
moral hazard and explicit incentive contracting at divisional level. The analysis focuses on the
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effect of a well functioning internal capital market operated by value maximizing headquarters
on the divisional managers’ incentives. Under Gautier and Heider’s setting an efficient ex-post
internal capital market may not be ex-ante efficient. The ex-post reallocation of resources
negatively affects the production process by creating negative effort externalities among
divisional managers. As a result, headquarters’ policies on compensation and investment should
be interrelated. Gautier and Heider predict that, in a multidivisional firm with winner picking, it
is more difficult to compensate divisional managers if there is redistribution of resources. An
optimal compensation policy must be sensitive to the performance of the strongest division
instead of following the performance of the average division.
In contrast, Stein (2001) argues that the authority to reallocate funds may have positive
ex-ante effects. The main argument is that divisional managers struggle to provide enough
positive, verifiable, information to convince the CEO to provide them a larger share of the
capital budget; hence, managers’ efforts turn out to be productive, rather than wasteful.
Stein’s (2001) model, however, does not allow for monetary incentives and relies entirely
on the assumption that the projects are symmetric. Inderst and Laux (2001) relax this assumption
by allowing for project asymmetry and include monetary incentives. Their model also allows for
contracting on the allocation of funds. Such contracting may yield several potential advantages
for firms. First, managerial incentives are improved when divisional capital allocation is
sensitive to the productivity of investment. Second, under contracting it may be optimal to bias
capital allocation towards one project in order to take into account different incentive effects for
different managers. If this capital allocation proves not to be ex-post optimal, it can be
renegotiated. While distorted capital allocation increases managers’ incentives, they only survive
renegotiation in integrated firms.

14
Inderst and Muller (2002) examine the role of headquarters when internal and external
capital markets are tied together. They compare the optimal contracting under “decentralized
borrowing” (outside investors and individual project managers) with contracting under
“centralized borrowing” (outside investors and headquarters). Centralization provides both
benefits and costs. On the one hand, headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash-flow
projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-flow projects, thus relaxing financial constraints
on individual divisions.

On the other hand, this allows divisional managers to finance

investments without returning to the external capital markets. That is, internal capital markets
provide headquarters with the ability to create value and, at the same time, headquarters are
protected from fully relinquishing the value gains to external investors.
In summary, the question of whether internal capital markets are used for an efficient
allocation of capital across division is subject of future inquires. Future studies should consider
the role of internal capital markets at the initiation of a cooperative alliance as well as throughout
the life of such alliances.
2.2. Empirical evidence
The empirical literature on internal capital market efficiency is a part of a broader body
of work as to the impact of diversification on the shareholder value. Most of the evidence, both
from domestic data and from other countries, is unfavorable to diversification and especially so
in the case of unrelated diversification. According to many studies, the majority of firms
involved in unrelated diversification have been valued at a substantial discount relative to
focused firms. This notion of a “diversification discount”, first developed by Lang and Stulz
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), denotes the difference between the value of a diversified
company and the sum of the imputed values of the stand-alone (individual) segments of the
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company. The source and interpretation of the diversification discount, known also as “negative
excess value”, has been the subject of debate for many scholars.
One of the explanations for the diversification discount, developed in agency cost
models, is that the diversification discount is a consequence of investment distortions that arise
due to disparity in investment opportunities across divisions. Lamont (1997) found that
investment in non-oil divisions of petroleum companies fell when the cash flow of the oil
divisions decreased dramatically following the 1986 decline in oil prices. Lamont hypothesized
that when the companies were financially constrained, the investments of single divisions
became dependent on the success of other divisions operating in unrelated industries, thereby
suggesting that diversified firms reallocate capital across divisions. However, Shin and Stulz
(1998) found that divisions with better investment opportunities do not necessarily have priority
in the allocation of funds. Shin and Stulz interpreted their results as evidence of internal capital
markets failing to reallocate resources in an efficient manner. Rajan et al. (2000) found that
industry-adjusted investment of higher-q divisions within conglomerates is low compared to the
industry-adjusted investment of lower-q divisions and concluded that this difference is driven by
cross-subsidization. These authors argue that cross-subsidization is more pronounced when
larger divisions have high growth opportunities and those of smaller divisions are lower.
On the other side of the debate, some recent studies have revealed at least two potential
sources of bias undermining the previous conclusions. Whited (2001) has argued that Tobin’s q
is a poor proxy for investment opportunities (observable measures of Tobin’s q may diverge
substantially from unobservable marginal q), and that the replication of some of the previous
studies, using measurement error consistent estimators (Erikson and Whited, 2000), shows no
evidence for cross-subsidization.

Whited has pointed out that if an inaccurate proxy for
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divisional investment opportunities is used, cash flow in one division may appear to be a
significant explanatory variable for investment in another division simply because the investment
opportunities may be correlated across divisions. Chevalier (2000) has shown that investment
patterns attributable to value destroying cross-subsidization are apparent in the pairs of merging
firms prior to their mergers. Chevalier analyzed the investment policies of a sample of
diversifying mergers (i.e., mergers between two firms with no business segments in any common
2-digit SIC codes in the year prior to the merger in which the two merging firms became two
divisions of the diversified firm). As the two firms operated independently prior to the merger,
no cross-subsidization of investment between the two firms could possibly take place.
Chevalier’s empirical analysis reveals that one partner firm’s cash flow is predicted by the other
partner’s investment prior to the merger. Targets with lower investment opportunities than the
acquirers’ appear to appear to have a higher industry adjusted investment expenditures. On the
other hand, Fan and Lang (2000) show that two digit SIC-based measures are likely to exclude
some instances where two business units are strategically related, for example the oil-refining
(SIC 29) and chemical (SIC 28) businesses are classified as unrelated at the two-digit level, when
in fact these industries are both vertically related and complementary.
As a result of these critiques, several recent studies have overcome the aforementioned
biases by developing new measures of the efficiency of internal capital markets. They have also
focused their analyses on specific settings designed to alleviate the measurement errors present
in previous studies. For example, Billet and Mauer (2001) examine the link between the excess
value and the value of the internal capital market of a diversified firm and develop a measure of
internal capital market that separately accounts for subsidies and transfers and the relative
efficiency of the resource flows. Furthermore, they condition their measurement on whether the
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segments receiving subsidies would be financially constrained as stand-alone firms. Billet and
Mauer’s results show no reliable statistical evidence that their excess value measure is
significantly related to the overall internal capital market measure. Nevertheless, a deeper
analysis indicates that efficient and inefficient subsidies to financially constrained segments
significantly increase value, while inefficient transfers (dollars flows away from segments having
good relative investment opportunities) significantly decrease value. The authors conclude that
the key benefit of internal capital markets is the ability to fund good investment opportunities of
segments that would be financially constrained if they were stand-alone firms.
Another way to circumvent the methodological critiques of Chevalier (2000) and Whited
(2001) is to analyze changes in investment policy around a corporate restructuring event.
Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2000) document that the investment behavior of a spun-off
division becomes more sensitive to industry q and that this effect is more pronounced for
divisions in low-q industries whose investment is sharply cut following the spin-off. Burch and
Nanda (2003) relate the value gains from spin-offs to attributes of the diversified firm’s internal
capital market. Their results show that the improvement in excess value following a spin-off is
related to the segments’ investment pattern moving closer to those of the stand-alone firms.
Ahn and Denis (2003) examine the total impact of the spin-off on investment policy and find that
the sample firm invest inefficiently prior to the spin-off and significantly improve investment
efficiency following the spin-off. They also find that the increase in the investment efficiency is
related to the increase in firm value.
The above-mentioned empirical studies analyze firms’ valuation and the efficiency of
internal capital markets around either a diversifying or a non-diversifying corporate event. The
formation of a business alliance constitutes an ideal empirical setting for the analysis of the
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change in discount and efficiency of internal capital allocation, as such alliances are designed as
diversifying corporate events for some firms and non-diversifying for others.
My dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I use a new criterion of
classifying alliances into diversifying and non-diversifying strategies. I document that a firm’s
decision to enter a diversifying or a non-diversifying alliance is not a random process and is the
result of a close interaction of internal and external factors. Second, I provide evidence on the
immediate impact of an alliance on the firm valuation. Such analysis provides additional
evidence on whether diversifying and non-diversifying strategies result in value creation or value
destruction.
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3. Essay 1:
Impact of Joint Ventures on the Capital Allocation and Efficiency of Internal
Investments in Partner Firms

In this essay I examine the impact of the formation of joint ventures on partner firm
valuation. I analyze the market reactions at the announcement of joint ventures for a sample
spanning 1991 to 1999. I further analyze the main determinants of a firm’s choice to enter either
a diversifying or a non-diversifying joint venture. Finally, I investigate the immediate impact of
the initiation of a joint venture on the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry
counterparts by examining excess values.
3.1. Hypotheses
3.1.1. Valuation effect at the announcement of joint ventures
The extant literature documents differing market reactions at the announcement of
corporate diversification events and focus preserving or focus increasing corporate events. It is
widely accepted that focus increasing or preserving events are value enhancing, while
diversifying changes are met with negative market reactions at the announcement2. Recent
evidence from the banking sector supports these conclusions as well (DeLong, 2001). Previous
empirical event studies unanimously agree that market reaction at the announcement of a joint
venture reflects investors’ perception that these hybrid forms of corporate governance are value
increasing. However, Mohanram and Nanda (1998) posit that despite the favorable average

2

For details, see Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarell (1995), John and Ofek
(1995), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003)
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effect, cross-sectional variation in the cumulative abnormal returns should be further
investigated.
In this study, I define a diversifying joint venture as a joint venture having no degree of
overlap with the parent company, i.e. when none of the partner company’s business segments
shares the same four-digit SIC code with the joint venture. The remaining joint ventures are
classified as non-diversifying. As joint ventures are considered hybrid forms of corporate
governance that share common characteristics with mergers, I hypothesize that:
H1: Non-diversifying joint ventures enhance stockholder value upon announcement,
while diversifying joint ventures do not create value and they may even destroy value.
3.1.2. Determinants of a choice of diversifying versus non-diversifying joint ventures
In what follows, I consider several variables that may influence a firm’s choice of
forming a diversifying or a non-diversifying joint venture. These variables measure the parent
firm’s industry concentration, economic conditions, complexity of the joint venture, ownership
and control, and firm age. Below, I discuss each of these variables in turn and give the main
arguments behind their predicted impact on a firms’ decision to initiate a specific type of joint
venture.
i) Industry Characteristics: One of the central arguments in the industrial organization
literature is that a firm’s profitability is determined by the degree of concentration in that
particular industry. Porter (1980), for example, argues that differences in profitability reflect the
differing barriers to entry across industries. According to Kogut (1991), firms facing the decision
to enter new markets, and in particular new business not related to their existing activities, may
find the initiation of a joint venture a promising start; a joint venture with an incumbent partner
firm can be regarded as an acquisition of the right to expand in the future in that specific
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industry. However, incumbent firms in profitable and highly concentrated industries may not
find joint ventures attractive as such ventures would cost them some market share. Firms in
highly competitive industries on the other hand should benefit from sharing scale economies and
coordinating joint management, through non-diversifying joint ventures. As well, as suggested
by Eisenhart and Schoonhoven (1996), firms in highly competitive industries have vulnerable
positions because product differentiation is difficult. Joint venture formation should enable such
firms to strengthen their relative position in the market. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize
that:
H2a: Partner firms in highly competitive industries are more likely to form nondiversifying joint ventures.
ii) Economic conditions: Maksimovic and Phillips (2000) analyzed the asset sales and
merger activities of a sample of manufacturing companies from 1974 to 1992. Their results
indicate that firms differ in their ability to exploit assets, and that the comparative advantages of
firms lie in their main industries One of the main factors influencing asset reallocation outside
such firm boundaries is the economic business cycle. In particular, there is clear evidence that
fewer assets are reallocated in a recession, presumably reflecting the reduced expectations of
profitability outside the firms’ most familiar businesses when the economy is weak. Moreover,
Coase (1937) argues that internal organization costs are higher the greater the dissimilarity
between the activities subject to the transaction and the existing activities developed by the firm.
Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2b: Diversifying joint ventures are less likely to be formed during a recession.
iii) Joint venture complexity: Several studies have documented differences between
technological and non-technological alliances (Teece, 1986; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993;
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Hagedoorn, 1993; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 1998). An alliance is classified as technological if the
alliance contract involves R&D activities, technology sharing, or product development.
Technological alliances are subject to severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems
because the true value of the output is difficult to assess accurately. This problem is more
pronounced in R&D joint ventures, in which partnering firms must transfer R&D know-how
across organizational boundaries. On the other hand, the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems are partially mitigated when the partnering firms already conduct activity that at least
partially overlaps the joint venture. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2c: Technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying
strategies.
iv) Ownership and control: It has long been recognized that joint ventures exhibit an
intriguing ownership pattern according to which equal or almost equal stakes of the joint venture
are allocated to the partner firms. This clustering of ownership around the 50-50 equity
allocations contradicts theoretical modeling that calls for optimal asymmetric ownership
structures (Darrough and Stoughton, 1989; Belleflamme and Bloch, 2000). Moreover, potential
disagreements between partners who possess equal shares of the joint venture may result in
permanent legal deadlock.
Recent evidence has shed some light on this puzzle. Hauswald and Hege (2004) show
that joint control, 50 plus one share, and outright majority control can coexist in equilibrium and
can be optimal depending on the attributes of the partner firms. In particular, equal ownership
offers protection against rent-seeking activities when such protection is relevant, 50 plus one
share equally splits the returns of the project while allocating control to the company that
provides the more valuable resources, and outright majority ownership is optimal when the
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partners are very dissimilar. As diversifying joint ventures are more likely to bring together two
dissimilar partner firms, I therefore hypothesize that:
H2d: The partner firm forming a diversifying joint venture is more likely to be granted
the outright majority ownership.
v) Firm’s age: Newly formed companies face the critical task of gaining acceptance
while protecting their proprietary assets. Accordingly, a young firm may enter into a nondiversifying joint venture for two reasons. First, since partnering with established firms provides
a positive signal of product quality, younger firms gain market recognition or legitimacy when
entering into an alliance within its core activities (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Stuart,
2000). Second, younger firms may be controlled by their founders who are less likely to enter
new lines of business outside their particular area of expertise (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997).
A mature firm with a well-established reputation, on the other hand, is more likely to concentrate
its resources on its own core activities and form alliances with firms that support peripheral
activities (Stopford and Wells, 1972). Each of these arguments suggests the hypothesis that:
H2e: A younger firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying joint venture with a high
overlap with its core activities, while a mature firm is more likely to form a joint
venture within its peripheral activities or even a diversifying joint venture.
vi) Growth opportunities: According to the resource-based theory of joint ventures, one
of the primary driving forces of an alliance formation is a firm’s need for resources. As opposed
to an acquisition, a joint venture provides the benefits of attaining know-how and capabilities
from partner firms while avoiding the cost of acquiring or managing the associated assets
(Williamson, 1991). However, for a joint venture to be profitable, the benefit of cost sharing and
learning through the joint venture should be higher than the cost of protecting the proprietary

24
assets within the alliance. The risk of losing proprietary core capabilities and skills increases
with the degree of overlap between joint venture’s activity and partner firms’ core activities.
Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2f: A firm with high growth options and lower operating performance is more likely to
form a non-diversifying joint venture that strongly overlaps with the firm’s existing
activities.
vii) Relative efficiency of the focal segment:
For non-diversifying joint ventures, two opposite arguments support the relative
efficiency of the focal segment (the segment whose activity is duplicated by the joint venture) as
one of the reasons behind joint venture formation.
Stopford and Wells (1972) argue that diversified firms involved in a joint venture on
peripheral lines of business do not desire as high a degree of control over these lines as they do
for their principal business lines. Mantecon and Chatefield (2004) posit that the formation of
some joint ventures constitutes an optimal temporary arrangement designed as the first step
towards a future asset sale3. Therefore, a firms’ choice of creating a non-diversifying joint
venture may be linked to the investment efficiency of the firm’s focal segment. If a firm fails to
operate one of its peripheral activities efficiently, a non-diversifying joint venture may the
optimal vehicle towards the complete sale of the weak division at a future date.
Kogut (1988) observes that a joint venture is encouraged if i) “one or both firms desire to
acquire the other’s organizational know-how” or if ii) “one firm wishes to maintain
organizational capability while benefiting from another’s current knowledge or cost advantage”.
3

An illustrating example is provided by the formation of a joint venture between Phillips and Whirlpool. In 1989,
in an effort to reorganize its diversified operation, Phillips offered its appliance division for sale. While negotiations
for a complete asset sale failed, the two companies had reached an agreement to create a joint venture. Whirlpool
acquired 53% stake in the appliance business, while Phillips maintained 47 % of the ownership. Two years later,
Whirlpool purchased the remaining 47 % of the joint venture.
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If the joint venture formation brings together two partners with different abilities in managing
assets, a transfer of expertise between the two throughout the joint venture’s life is more likely.
Therefore, a non-diversifying joint venture provides the partner firms with the opportunity of
sharing the necessary expertise in managing assets. As a result, the efficiency of the segment
whose activity is duplicated by the joint venture is implicitly improved. Based on these
arguments, I hypothesize that:
H2g: A firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying joint venture with a low degree of
overlap when the investment ratio of the focal segment is low.
3.1.3. Change in excess value around joint venture formation
The third issue I examine in this essay is the effect of a joint venture on the valuation of
the partner firms relative to the industry. Lang, Poulson, and Stulz (1994) argue that asset sales
are often an expedient financing mechanism when access to external capital is limited. Dittmar
and Shivdashani (2003) empirically prove that asset sales relax external financial constraints and
allow firms to undertake valuable investments that would otherwise be foregone. They also show
that there is a statistical significant change in excess value of the firms divesting some of their
assets, as market participants have the ability to recognize their positive effects on the firm as a
whole. On the other hand, Gertner et al. (1994) has argued that a diversified firm with an
efficient internal capital allocation will avoid transactions in the asset markets (“external
liquidation”) by redeploying assets internally (“internal liquidation”). According to Shleifer and
Vishny (1992), asset sales can lead to low sales prices when firms are operating within depressed
industries characterized by a very low liquidity of asset markets. Therefore, diversified firms
operating in these industries are more likely to redeploy assets internally rather than divesting
them through sales. Joint venture formation thus allows the partner firms to avoid transacting in
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the asset markets when market conditions are unfavorable and provides the partner firm the
opportunity of sharing the necessary resources for undertaking valuable investments.
However, in some instances valuable resources may be diverted from internal investment
opportunities, as firms may have to fall back on their internal capital markets in order to initiate
and continue investments in the newly created entity. This problem is exacerbated for single
segment firms, as the capital needed for investment is diverted from their only division.
Khanna et al. (1998) have argued that the degree of overlap between alliance scope and
partner firm scope determines the amount of resources that firms allocate to learning from their
alliance partner Therefore, a joint venture having the same scope as one of the peripheral
segments or whenever is designed as a diversifying strategy requires a relatively small amount of
investment, and thus impacts internal resources by a lesser extent. Along the same lines, Singh
and Mitchell (1996) show that the performance of the business unit involved in the alliance
becomes closely related to the change in the strategy of the business partner. Their results show
that focal business units face increased risk of dissolution if the collaborative business unit shuts
down, is divested, or forms a collaborative relationship with a new partner. One implication of
their findings is that, after the alliance formation, the focal business unit becomes more
dependent on the strategy developed by the partner and less dependent on the strategy of its
partner firm. Thus, hypothesis 3 is stated as follows:
H3: A joint venture negatively affects the excess value of a single segment firm, and is
less likely to have any impact on the excess value of a multiple segment firm.
3.1.4. Impact of joint ventures on internal capital markets
Using a sample of multiple segment firms, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) have
documented a positive relationship between an excess value metric, as developed by Berger and
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Ofek (1995), and the relative value added by allocation, as measure of investment efficiency of
internal capital markets. In other words, the valuation of multiple segment firms relative to their
industry partially reflects the efficiency of internal capital markets. The results of Rajan, Servaes,
and Zingales have been confirmed by several other empirical studies. One of these studies, Ahn
and Denis (2003), shows that a corporate restructuring through a spin-off leads to an
improvement in the investment efficiency of a firm from one year prior to one year after the
spin-off. They also find a positive change in the excess value of the firm around the time of the
announced spin-off and document a positive relationship between changes in excess value and
change the overall investment efficiency. The results of Ahn and Denis indicate that firms invest
inefficiently prior to the spin-off and the inefficiency is, to at least some degree, eliminated
following the spin-off. Using a sample of firms that undertake a business segment divestiture,
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) report similar empirical findings. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H4: There is a positive relationship between the change in excess value and change in
investment efficiency for multiple segment firms forming joint ventures.
3.2. Definitions of Variables for Estimation and Methodology
In this section, I specify the precise variables applied in my empirical estimations and
describe the statistical methodology I have used to test the above hypotheses.
3.2.1. Market reaction around joint venture announcements
In order to analyze the market reaction at the announcement of diversifying and nondiversifying joint ventures, I employ an event study methodology analogous to the one used by
Dodd and Warner (1983). The abnormal performance for each firm is estimated using a market
model that to adjusts for market-wide factors and for risk. For a given firm j, the abnormal return
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on each of the trading days around the announcement of the joint venture is defined as the
predicted error,

(

)

PE jt = R jt − αˆ j + βˆ j Rmt ,
where,

R jt = continuously compounded rate of return to firm j at event date t,
Rmt = continuously compounded rate of return to the CRSP value weighted index at event day t
The estimation period for the market model begins on day 155 and ends with day 45
before the day of the announcement. Significance tests performed are based a standardized test
statistic constructed so as to determine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly
different from zero. The Z-statistic is normally distributed and controls for the number of
observations in the estimation period and for the market fluctuations during the event window.
The presence of outliers with very large standard deviation is indicated by the average CAR and
Z-statistics having opposite signs. I also perform the binomial test to indicate whether the
percentage of positive abnormal returns is statistically significant.

3.2.2. A Firm’s Choice of Entering a Joint Venture as Diversifying or Non-diversifying
Strategy
This section presents the Heckman two-stage selection model, which I apply to first
analyze a firm’s choice between a diversifying and a non-diversifying joint venture (sample
selection). Second, given that a non-diversifying joint venture has been chosen, I study the main
factors that explain the degree of overlap between the joint venture and the existing activities
developed by the partner firms (substantial analysis).
The equation that determines a firm’s choice between a non-diversifying and a
diversifying joint venture (sample selection) is:
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z i* = wi' γ + u i

(1)

z i = 1 if z i* > 0 and 0 otherwise;

( )
Prob(z = 0 w ) = 1 − Φ (w γ )
Prob(z i = 1 wi ) = Φ wi' γ
i

'
i

i

The regression model (substantial analysis) is:
yi = xi' β + ε i

(2)

where yi is observed when z i* = 1 . ui and ε i have a bivariate normal distribution with
zero means and correlation ρ .

( )

( )

E [y i z i = 1, xi , wi ] = xi' β + ρσ ε λ wi' γ , where λ wi' γ =

φ (wi' γ ) 4
.
Φ (wi' γ )

The marginal effects of the regressors on yi consist of two components. The first effect is
a direct one on the mean of yi , which is . The second effect, an indirect one, is the influence on yi
of any independent variable appearing in the probability that z i* is positive. This influence is
directed through the presence of the independent variable in λi .
The full effect of changes in a regressor that appears in both xi and wi on y is

(

)= β

∂E y i z i* > 1
∂xik

k

⎛ ρσ ε
− γ k ⎜⎜
⎝ σu

⎞
⎟⎟δ (α u ), where δ i = λi2 − α i λi .
⎠

The first step of Heckman’s method is to estimate the probit equation (1) by maximum
likelihood to obtain estimates of γ . For each observation in the selected sample it computes

λˆi = φ ( wi' γˆ ) / Φ ( wi' γˆ ) and δˆi = λˆi (λˆi − wi' γˆ ) . The second step consists on estimating the β and

β λ = ρσ e by least squares regression of y on x and λ̂ . In my analysis, the dependent variable in

4

For details see Green (2002)
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the probit analysis (selection model) is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm is
entering a joint venture as a non-diversifying strategy. In the second step of the Heckman
procedure (substantial analysis), an OLS regression analysis of the firms and divisional
characteristics on the degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and the existing
business segments of the firm is performed. In this substantial analysis I use the selection bias
control factor Lambda as an additional independent variable. This factor reflects the effect of all
the unmeasured characteristics, which are related to diversifying/non-diversifying decision; the
coefficient of Lambda catches part of the effect of these characteristics that is related to the
degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and existing business segments. In summary,
the coefficient of Lambda indicates whether there is selection bias and what the direction of this
bias is. A significant positive coefficient indicates that firms entering a non-diversifying joint
venture have unmeasured characteristics, which are positively related to the degree of overlap
between joint venture activity and existing activities undertaken by the partner firm.
The determinants of a firm’s decision to form a joint venture as a diversifying versus
non-diversifying strategy are as follows: a) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measured as
N

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index= ∑ α i2 , where α i represents the market share of firm i within an
i =1

industry with N firms; b) Technology dummy that takes value 1 if the contract specifies either
one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development; c) GDP is the real growth in
the Gross Domestic Product; d) Ownership is an indicator that takes value 1 if the firm has more
than fifty percent of the ownership in the joint venture; e) LnAge defined as the natural logarithm
of the difference between the month when the partner firm appears for the first time on CRSP
and the month of the joint venture formation.
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The determinants of investment in a non-diversifying joint venture, i.e. a joint venture
with the same SIC code with the one of the existing business segments are as follows: a) LnAge;
b) Relative efficiency ratio of the focal segment, i.e. the existing business segment having the
same SIC as the joint venture, defined as the difference between the ratio of cash flow and sales
for the focal segment and the median ratio of cash flow and sales for the industry divided by the
median ratio of cash flow and sales for the industry; c) a growth indicator dummy set to 1 when
market-to-book market to book ratio of the firm is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise; d) Cash flow
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio
relative to the total assets of the firm; e) Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and
other expenses, before depreciation and amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of
the firm. Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), I use the ratio of the firms’ market
value of assets to book value of assets as a proxy for growth options in the firm’s investment
opportunity set. Market value equals the book value of assets minus the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity.
3.2.3. Measure of relative valuation
In measuring the relative valuation of the partner firms I follow Berger and Ofek (1995),
and define the excess value as follows:
n
⎛ V ⎞
⎟⎟, and I (V ) = ∑ Assetsi × [M i (V / Assets) MS ]
Excess Value = log⎜⎜
i =1
⎝ I (V ) ⎠

(3)

n
⎛ V ⎞
⎟⎟, and I (V ) = ∑ Salesi × [M i (V / Sales) MS ]
Excess Value = log⎜⎜
i =1
⎝ I (V ) ⎠

(4)

where V is the sum of market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value
of equity and deferred taxes, I(V) is the imputed firm value, Assetsi is the segment i’s assets,
Salesi is segment i’s sales; M i (V / Assets) MS and M i (V / Sales) MS are the assets and sales
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multipliers calculated as the median of the single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code
industry. A negative excess value indicates that the firm is valued at a discount, while a positive
value indicates that the firm is valued at a premium. I examine the excess value of the firms that
enter into a joint venture in the year before and the year after the joint venture formation.
3.2.4. Measures of internal capital markets’ efficiency
I use three proxies to measure the allocation efficiency of the internal capital market. The
first measure is the relative value added by allocation (RVA) as initially developed by Rajan et
al. (2000).
n
⎛ Capex j Capex ssj
⎡ Capex j Capex ssj ⎤ ⎞
⎜
RVA = ∑ S j (q j − q )
−
− ∑ wJ ⎢
−
⎥ ⎟⎟ FirmSale s
ss
ss
⎜ Sj
S
S
S
=
1
j =1
j
j
j
j
⎣⎢
⎦⎥ ⎠
⎝
n

where S j is the sales of the segment j,

Capex ssj
S ssj

(5)

is the sales-weighted average ratio of the

single segment firms in the same industry as the segment of diversified firm, w j is the ratio of
segment j sales, q j is the asset-weighted Tobin’s q of single segment firms operating in the same
three digit SIC industry as segment j, and q is the segment sales-weighted q j ’s of the firm.

S , q j , and w j are year prior values.

Capex j
Sj

−

Capex ssj
S ssj

is a proxy for transfer made between

segments of a diversified firm and is the difference between segment’s investment ratio and the
sales-weighted

average

investment

ratio

of

single

segment

firms

in

the

same

⎡ Capex j Capex ssj ⎤
industry. ∑ w j ⎢
−
⎥ reflects the overall funds available to a diversified firm
S ssj ⎦⎥
j =1
⎣⎢ S j
n

relative to its single segment peers and is subtracted from the industry-adjusted investment ratio
in order to correct for potential differences in availability of total capital that should not count as
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transfer. Finally, (q j − q ) categorizes those segments that have above average investment
opportunities. In summary, a positive RVA reflects an efficient ICM because capital is
transferred to segments with above average investment opportunities; hence the firm invests
more than single segment industry counterparts in those segments.
The second measure of the efficiency of internal allocation that I use, as developed
initially by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) is q sensitivity of investment.
⎡⎛ Capex ⎞ ⎛ FirmCapex ⎞⎤
Sales
(
q
q
)
−
⎟⎥ FirmSales
⎟ −⎜
⎢⎜
∑
j
j
j =1
⎣⎢⎝ Sales ⎠ j ⎝ FirmSales ⎠⎦⎥
n

(6)

where Capex is the capital expenditures of the segment, FirmCapex is the capital
expenditure of the firm, q j is the imputed Tobin’s q of segment j and q is the segment salesweighted q j ’s of the firm. This measure is positive if a segment with an above average q has an
investment ratio above the firm’s average; hence, q sensitivity indicated whether the firm has
invested relatively more in the high-q segments of the firm and relatively less in the low-q
segments.
The third measure I use, developed by Peyer (2002), is the cash flow sensitivity. While
similar to the q investment sensitivity, the cash flow sensitivity provides the advantage of relying
on individual segment information, rather than on imputed values.
n

∑ Sales
j =1

j

⎡⎛ Capex ⎞ ⎛ FirmCapex ⎞⎤
(cf j − c f ) ⎢⎜
⎟⎥ FirmSales
⎟ −⎜
⎢⎣⎝ Sales ⎠ j ⎝ FirmSales ⎠⎥⎦

(7)

where cf j is the cash flow to sales ratio and c f is the average cash flow to sales ratio of
the firm.
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Similar to the other two measures, cash flow sensitivity indicates whether the firm has
invested relatively more in segments generating higher cash flows and relatively less in segments
generating cash flows below the firm’s average.

3.3. Results
3.3.1. Data and summary statistics
Using a sample spanning 1991-1999, I examine the market reaction to the
announcements of joint venture formations, the main determinants of a firm’s choice to form a
joint venture as a diversifying and non-diversifying strategy and whether joint venture formation
favorably affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry counterparts. The list
of domestic joint ventures comes from Thompson Financial Security database (SDC- Joint

Ventures/Alliances). Besides the announcement date and the effective date, the SDC reports
other information about the joint ventures, such as: name of the partner firms, main SIC code for
the joint ventures and each partner firm, and type of the joint ventures, among others. It also
reports a brief description of the activity of the joint venture. In order to test H1 through H2g, I
select only joint ventures formed by two publicly traded firms with available financial data on
Compustat both at the firm and business segment level one year prior to the joint venture
formation. I start with an initial sample of 545 joint ventures formed by publicly traded industrial
partner firms. I select only those joint ventures where both firms have financial data on the
Compustat Industry Segment file one year before the joint venture formation. This leaves a total
of 239 joint ventures initiated by 478 partner firms between 1991 and 1999.
I classify a joint venture as a diversifying corporate strategy when none of partner’s
business segments share the same four digits SIC code with the primary SIC of the joint venture.
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Similarly, a non-diversifying joint venture implies that at least one of the business segments of
the partner firm is the same with the one of joint venture.
Figure 1
On June 10, 1997, AAR Corp and General Electric Co formed a joint venture to manufacture and supply turbine
engines. The new company, Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC, was to supply CF6-6, -50, and -80A engine
parts to aviation customers worldwide. It operates out of Wood Dale, Illinois. Financial details of the agreement
were not disclosed.
General Electric Co.
(SIC code 9997)

AAR CORP
(SIC code 5080)
Joint Venture
Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC
(SIC code 3724)

General Electric Co.
Business segments
Aircraft Engine
Major Appliances
Materials
Technical products
Broadcasting
Financing
Specialty insurance
Other
Power generation
Industrial products and services

SIC code
3724
3630
3089
3845
4833
6141
6331
6799
3511
3640

Turbine Engine Asset
Management LLC
SIC code

AAR CORP
Business segments

SIC code

3724

Industrial services

5080

Figure 1 illustrates an example of a joint venture formation as a non-diversifying strategy
for one of the partner firms and as a diversifying strategy for the other. The newly created entity
(Turbine Engine Asset Management LLC) has the same primary SIC code with the Aircraft
Engine segment of General Electric Co. I classify this joint venture as a diversifying strategy for
the AAR CORP and as a non-diversifying strategy for General Electric Co.
Table I presents the annual distribution of the joint ventures. The minimum number of
joint ventures formations in the sample is 28 during the year of 1992 and the maximum number
is 42 during the year of 1997. Across the years, the annual percentage number of joint ventures is
similar for diversifying and non-diversifying sub-samples. Panel B shows the distribution of the
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partner firms across industries. There is a high representation of manufacturing firms, accounting
for 46.65% of the total sample. However, the distribution of non-diversifying versus diversifying
joint ventures across industries is similar.

Table I
The sample consists on 360 firms that initiate joint ventures with no overlap with the concurrent activities
(diversifying joint ventures) and 118 firms that initiate joint ventures with overlap with one of the concurrent
activities (non-diversifying joint ventures).
Panel A: Partner firms by year
Diversifying JV

Non-diversifying JV

Year
1991

N
43

%
11.94

N
19

%
16.10

1992

19

5.28

9

7.63

1993

30

8.33

8

6.78

1994

38

10.56

12

10.17

1995

43

11.94

19

16.10

1996

51

14.17

17

14.41

1997

65

18.06

19

16.10

1998

37

10.28

9

7.63

1999

34

9.44

6

5.08

Total

360

100

118

100

Panel B: Partner firms by industry
Non-diversifying JV

Diversifying JV
Industry (2 digit SIC codes)
Agriculture, Mining, Constructions (01-17)

N
38

%
10.56

N
20

%
16.95

172

47.78

51

43.22

Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas,
and Sanitary Service (40-49)
Wholesale and Retail Trade (50-59)

49

13.61

17

14.41

23

6.39

6

5.08

General Services and Others (70-99)

78

21.66

24

20.34

360

100

118

100

Manufacturing (20-39)

Total

37
Table II shows the means and medians of selected variables and the non-parametric test
for differences in means for partner firms entering diversifying and non-diversifying joint
ventures.

Table II
The sample consists on 118 firms that initiate non-diversifying joint ventures and 360 firms that initiate nondiversifying joint ventures. Age is the number of months between the first listing of the partner firm on CRSP and
the date of the announcement. Market to book ratio is the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets.
Research and development is equal to research and development expenditures divided by total sales. Debt ratio is
defined as debt over book value of assets where debt is the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Cash flow
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total
assets of the firm. Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses, before depreciation and
amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of the firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as
N

Herfindahl Index= ∑ α i2 where α i represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N firms. The last
i =1

column shows the significance level of Mann-Whitney test for the differences in mean. *, **, and *** represent
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Diversifying
p-value
Non-diversifying
Joint Ventures
Joint Ventures
Age

283.38
(172.43)

308.39
(206.85)

0.365

Market to Book ratio

1.864
(1.234)

1.917
(1.277)

0.824

Research and Development

1.142
(0.040)

1.352
(0.044)

0.761

Debt ratio

0.260
(0.230)

0.249
(0.231)

0.893

Cash Flow from Operating Activities

0.088
(0.127)

0.112
(0.132)

0.379

Operating Income

0.062
(0.093)

0.070
(0.086)

0.780

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

0.230
(0.164)

0.273
(0.187)

0.130

118

360

Number of firms

Firms entering diversifying joint ventures seem to be, on average, more mature, have a
higher market to book ratio, and have a lower debt ratio than firms entering non-diversifying
joint ventures. However, none one of the differences in their means is statistically significant at
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the conventional levels. Because firms are not required to report research and development
expenses unless they exceed 1% of the sales, the research and development ratio cannot be
calculated for all the firms in the sample. The mean and median for this variable are reported for
72 non-diversifying joint ventures and 234 diversifying joint ventures.5 The percentage of firms
forming a non-diversifying joint venture where they have a minority of ownership is higher than
that of firms forming a diversifying joint venture. Out of 118 firms that form a non-diversifying
joint venture, only 18 firms (15.25%) have a minority share of ownership in the joint venture
compared to 32 firms (8.89%) out of 360 firms for diversifying joint ventures. Although not
included in the table, I find a higher proportion of technological joint ventures formed as a nondiversifying strategy than diversifying strategy (52.54% versus 43.33%).

3.3.2. Market reaction around the announcement of joint venture formations
I investigate the market abnormal return for the whole sample of firms entering joint
ventures, as well as for the diversifying and non-diversifying joint ventures sub-samples.
Consistent with McConnell and Nantell (1985) and all the following event studies investigating
the market reaction around the announcement of joint ventures formation, I find statistical
significant positive abnormal returns for the whole sample. Table III summarizes the abnormal
returns over different time intervals around the date of the announcement. I obtain a significant
mean two–day cumulative abnormal return of 1.02% for the event window (-1, 0), and a
significant mean five days abnormal return of 1.30% for the event window (-2, +2). The
binomial test indicates that the percentage of positive abnormal returns is significant for both
event windows (-1, 0) and (-2, +2). The results are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis
1, namely that the positive market reaction to the announcements of joint ventures formation is
5

Following Campa and Kedia (2003), I replace all the missing observations with zero and compute the medians for
the two sub-samples. The difference remains statistically insignificant at the conventional levels.
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confined to the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint ventures. Panel B shows that the
announcements of diversifying joint ventures are met with a positive insignificant market
reaction. Woolridge and Snow (1990) also document that there is an insignificant market
reaction to the announcements of joint ventures as means of expansion in new markets with old
products, which already might have been anticipated by investors. Panel C presents the market
reaction for the announcements of non-diversifying joint ventures. I document a significant mean
two-day cumulative abnormal return of 2.44% for the event window (-1, 0), and a significant
mean five-day cumulative abnormal return of 3.52% for the event window (-2, +2).
Table III
Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 478 firms that announced joint ventures
formation during the period 1991-1999. The sample consists on 360 firms that initiate diversifying joint ventures
and 118 firms that initiate non-diversifying joint venture. Joint ventures are identified from the SDC database.
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days
before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The
abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio of the number of firms with
positive abnormal returns to the total number of firms. The generalized sign test is used to test the significance of the
percentage of firms with positive abnormal returns. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Partner firms
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-5 to –1

Mean%
0.39

Median %
-0.33

z-statistic
-0.46

Generalized sign test
48

-2 to +2

1.30

0.14

2.18**

52**

-1 to 0

1.02

0.24

3.21***

53**

+1 to +5

-0.43

-0.31

-1.51*
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Panel B: Partner firms for diversifying joint ventures
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-5 to –1

Mean%
0.35

Median %
-0.10

z-statistic
0.01

Generalized sign test
50

-2 to +2

0.56

-0.14

0.20

48

-1 to 0

0.55

0.10

1.23

49

+1 to+ 5

-0.41

-0.53

-1.72**

45*
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(table III continued)
Panel C: Partner firms for non-diversifying joint ventures
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-5 to –1

Mean%
0.50

Median%
-0.91

-2 to +2

3.52

1.28

4.04***

65***

-1 to 0

2.44

0.64

4.33***

64***

-0.48

0.18

-0.04

52

+1 to+ 5

z-statistic
-0.95

Generalized sign test
42

The abnormal return for the event window (-5, -1) is insignificant suggesting that there
is little anticipation of the announcements. The analysis of the abnormal return for the event
window (+1, +5) indicates that the market fails to fully capitalize the information contained with
the joint venture announcement at the time of the announcement. However, further analysis for
the two sub-samples indicates that this effect is confined to diversifying joint ventures. This
result provides partial evidence on the puzzle of the negative market reaction following the
announcement of alliances6.

3.3.3 Determinants of a diversifying versus non-diversifying strategic alliance formation
Table IV presents the analysis of the main determinants of a firm’s decision to form a
non-diversifying or a diversifying joint venture. Furthermore, given the choice of a nondiversifying joint venture the analysis presents the main determinants of the firm’s choice of the
activity of the joint venture as one of the existing activities, i.e. the degree of overlap between the
joint ventures activity and the activities of the existing business segments.

6

Socher (2004) notes that the negative market reaction following strategic alliances formation is yet to be explained:
”Whereas this phenomenon is seen in several event studies, a rational explanation is not found yet.”
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Table IV
The dependent variable in the selection model is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for non-diversifying joint
ventures and 0 otherwise. On the second and third column, the dependent variable is the degree of overlap of the
joint venture with one of the existing segments of the partner firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as
N

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index = ∑ α i2 , where α i represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N
i =1

firms. GDP is the real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. Technology dummy takes value 1 if the contract
specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development and 0 otherwise. Ownership is an
indicator that takes value 1 if the firm has more than fifty percent of the ownership in the joint venture LnAge is the
natural logarithm of the number of months between the first listing of the partner firm on CRSP and the date of the
announcement.. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a
ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses,
before depreciation and amortization, and is measures as a ratio to total assets of the firm. The growth dummy is an
indicator variable, which is one if the firm is high-growth, and 0 otherwise. Relative efficiency ratio is defined as
cash flow at segment level divided by total sales of the segment minus the industry median divided by industry
median and is calculated for the segment that has the same SIC code with the that of the joint venture. Number of
segments represents the number of segments of the partner firm. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Predicted sign Selection model (1) Substantial analysis (1) Substantial analysis (2)
Regressions
Constant

0.1043
(0.74)

HerfindahlHirschman Index

-

-0.6255**
(0.03)

GDP

-

-8.9900**
(0.03)

Technology
dummy

+

0.2789**
(0.03)

Ownership
indicator

-

-0.3463*
(0.07)

LnAge

-

-0.0348
(0.43)

Operating Income

-

Cash flow form
operations

-

Growth dummy

+

Relative efficiency
ratio

+/-

Number of
segments
LAMBDA
Total effect of age
Model p-value

-

1.7471
(0.00)

1.7550
(0.00)

-0.1002***
(0.00)

-0.0978***
(0.00)

-0.0001
(0.71)
-0.0555
(0.73)

0.00***

0.1302**
(0.04)

0.1310**
(0.04)

0.0475
(0.37)

0.0484
(0.36)

-0.0003
(0.22)
0.513***
-0.007***
0.00***

-0.0003
(0.22)
0.527***
-0.013*
0.00***
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The dependent variable for the probit model (selection model) is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 for partner firms forming non-diversifying joint ventures and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable at the second stage (the OLS analysis) is the degree of overlap between joint
venture activity (four digits SIC code) and the activity of existing business segments. The degree
of overlap is defined as the ratio of the sale of the focal business segment (the segment with the
same SIC code as the primary SIC of the joint venture) and the total sales at the firm level.
The results at the selection model level indicate that non-diversifying joint ventures are
less likely to be formed by firm in highly concentrated industries, and during economic
downturns. The analysis indicates that partnering firms are more likely to form technological
non-diversifying joint ventures, and that they are willing to accept a minority ownership in the
newly created entity. Consistent with predictions formulated by hypothesis 2a, the coefficient of
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is negative and significant at 5% level. Therefore, firms in highly
competitive industries are willing to form non-diversifying joint ventures in order to preserve
their market share. The coefficient of GDP is negative and significant, indicating that asset
redeployment outside the firm’s boundaries through non-diversifying joint venture formations is
less likely during economic expansion. This result is consistent with the implications formulated
by Maksimovic and Phillips (1999) for asset sales. Following their argument, my finding that
non-diversifying joint ventures are less likely during economic upturns is consistent with the fact
that firms are less likely to deploy capacity outside firm’s boundaries when growth resumes. The
results also indicate that technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as a nondiversifying strategy in order to minimize the moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Finally, the coefficient of ownership variable is negative and significant at 10% level, a result
consistent with the main prediction formulated by hypothesis H2d.
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The difference between the two substantial analyses consists of using two different
variables that capture firms’ operating performance before the joint venture formation. The
analysis of the marginal effect of age on the degree of overlap shows that younger firms are more
likely to form joint ventures with a high degree of overlap with the existing activities. This result
is consistent with the argument that younger firms in search for market recognition form joint
ventures in the same line of expertise as their core activities. The coefficient of the growth
dummy has the predicted sign and is significant in both substantial analyses. Consistent with
hypothesis H2f, this result indicates that firms entering non-diversifying joint ventures are more
likely to have investment opportunities that can be profitably integrated with the joint venture. I
do not find evidence that firms with a higher performance enter a joint venture with a higher
degree of overlap with the existing activities7. The coefficients of Operating income and Cash
Flow from Operations are statistically insignificants. Also, the coefficient of the relative
efficiency of the focal segment has the predicted sign but is insignificant at the conventional
levels. This result indicates that, on average, the segments whose activities are duplicated by the
activity of the joint venture are managed equally efficient, regardless of the degree of overlap.
The coefficient of Lambda is statistically different from zero, indicating that that there are
unmeasured characteristics, which make firms choose to enter a non-diversifying joint venture,
correlated with the degree of overlap between joint venture activity and existing activities
undertaken by the partner firm.

3.3.4 Changes in excess value around joint venture formation
The sample used to test hypotheses H3 and H4 is constructed using a multiple-stage
process. I start with the sub-sample of 308 partner firms forming a joint venture during the

7

Mohanram and Nanda (1998) finds that partnering firms forming joint ventures underperform their industry
counterparts
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period of 1991 and 1997. First, I exclude firms that do not have financial data available on
Compustat, both at the firm and segment level, one year after the joint venture formation. I also
exclude any firm that has at least one financial segment or one of its business segments is not
assigned an SIC. Second, following the convention in the literature, I exclude any firms where
the sum of divisional assets deviates by more than 25% of the firm total assets8. This sample
cleaning process results in 184 firms that form a joint venture. The restriction of the sample for
the period during 1991 and 1997 is motivated by the change in accounting standards in reporting
data at the segment level. Information at the segment level follows the regulations of the
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC).
In 1997 the Securities and Exchange Committee adopted the Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards 131 (SFAS 131) that replaced SFAS 14. Under the SFAS 14, a company was required
to report a segment if more than 10 % of assets, sales or profit could be attributed to an industry
sector. According to SFAS 14, an industry segment was “a component of an enterprise engaged
in providing a product or service or a group of related products and services primarily to
unaffiliated customers…for profit”. Recognizing that the information released according to
SFAS 14 was ineffective, as many diversified firms reported themselves as single segment firms,
the FASB replaced the industry segment-reporting standard with the one on the basis of
“operating segments”. Under the new accounting standard, SFAS 13, a company is required to
report financial information on the basis of “operating segments” for which separate financial
information is available, the management regularly evaluates how to allocate resources, and
assesses performance. More precisely, an operating segment is defined as a component of a
business that engages in activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses, whose
operating results are regularly reviewed by the enterprise’s “chief operating decision maker” to
8

This restriction was imposed by Berger and Ofek (1995) when deriving the excess value measures
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make decisions about resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its performance.
Finally, an operating segment is a component of the business for which discrete financial
information is available. Table V presents the annual distribution of the sub-sample of firms
forming joint ventures between 1991 and 1996. The distribution is relatively uniform for the first
four years and slightly higher for the years of 1995 and 1996.

Table V
The sample consists on 184 firms that initiated joint ventures between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to
calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995).
Panel A: Partner firms by year
Single segment firms
Multiple segment firms
All sample
Year
1991

N
29

%
15.76

N
15

%
13.89

N
14

%
18.42

1992

25

13.59

17

15.74

8

10.53

1993

28

15.22

10

9.26

18

23.68

1994

22

11.96

17

15.74

5

6.58

1995

38

20.65

21

19.44

17

22.37

1996

42

22.83

28

25.93

14

18.42

Total

184

100

108

100

76

100

Panel B: Partner firms by year
All sample

Diversifying JV

Non-diversifying JV

Year
1991

N
29

%
15.76

N
12

%
24.00

N
17

%
12.69

1992

25

13.59

9

18.00

16

11.94

1993

28

15.22

7

14.00

21

15.67

1994

22

11.96

6

12.00

16

11.94

1995

38

20.65

7

14.00

31

23.13

1996

42

22.83

9

18.00

33

24.63

Total

184

100

50

100

134

100
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(table V continued)
Panel C: Partner firms by industry
All sample
Industry (2 digit SIC codes)
Agriculture, Mining, Constructions (01-17)

N
23

%
12.50

Manufacturing (20-39)

97

52.72

Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Service (40-49)

19

10.33

Wholesale and Retail Trade (50-59)

12

6.52

General Services and Others (70-99)

33

17.93

184

100

Total

Panel A distinguishes between single segment and multiple segments firms, while Panel
B distinguishes between firms entering diversifying and non-diversifying joint ventures. Panel C
indicates that the distribution of firms across industries follows the same pattern as for the whole
sample, with a high representation of firms from manufacturing industries and a low
representation of Wholesale and Retail Trade industries.
Table VI presents the mean and median excess value based on asset and sales multiplier
of the partner firms in the year before and the year after joint venture formation. The mean
excess value before joint venture formation is a statistically significant 0.037 based on asset
multiplier and 0.053 based on sales multiplier. Therefore, the partner firms in my sample are
valued at 8.89% above the imputed value based on asset multiplier, and 11.29% above the
imputed value based on sales multiplier. In the year following the joint venture formation, the
average excess value is a statistically insignificant –0.010 based on asset multiplier and –0.021
for sales multiplier. Consistent with the view that joint ventures formation diversifies the capital
need of the partner firms, the decrease in excess value from before to after the joint venture
formation is statistically significant at 1% level.
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Table VI
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the joint
ventures formation. The sample consists of 184 firms that initiated a joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with
sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). Panel A reports results for the full
sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. Median values are reported in parentheses below mean value. The last
row of every panel reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Partner firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.037**
(0.021)

184

0.052**
(0.034)

183

Excess value after

-0.010
(0.000)

184

-0.021
(- 0.021)

182

Difference

0.000***

0.000***

Panel B: Single segment firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.066***
(0.029)

108

0.121***
(0.072)

107

Excess value after

0.000
(-0.001)

108

0.014
(-0.019)

106

Difference

0.000***

Panel C: Multiple segment firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

0.000***

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.002
(0.005)

76

-0.044
(0.010)

76

Excess value after

-0.025
(0.002)

76

-0.071***
(-0.045)

76

Difference

0.263

0.456

Panel D: Partner firms forming a non-diversifying joint venture
Number of
Excess value based on
observations
asset multiplier
Excess value before

Excess value after

Difference

0.084**
(0.040)
- 0.011
(0.002)
0.000***

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

50

0.070*
(0.049)

49

50

0.009
(-0.020)

49

0.000**
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(table VI continued)
Panel E: Partner firms forming a diversifying joint venture
Number of
Excess value based on
observations
asset multiplier

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.020
(0.010)

135

0.045
(0.028)

134

Excess value after

-0.009
(-0.001)

135

- 0.033
(-0.024)

133

Difference

0.169

0.001***

I also separate the joint venture partners into two groups based on number of segments.
The analysis indicates that the results of a premium before the joint venture formation is
confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms While single segment firms are valued at a
premium one year before the joint venture formation, the excess value for multiple segment
firms is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the change in excess value
documented for the whole sample seems to be confined to the sub-sample of single segment
firms. In the year after the joint venture formation, firms in both sub-samples have a statistically
insignificant excess value. Similar results are obtained when using sale multiplier for the subsample of single segment firms.
My results are in the same line of arguments with the evidence presented by Berger and
Ofek (1995). Their results indicate that the excess value of the multiple segment firms is lower
that the excess value for single segment firms. For my sample, this relation still holds, but the
magnitude of the excess value that I document for the sample of partnering firms entering a joint
venture is higher. However, the analysis performed for the two sub-sample emphasize that joint
venture creation is a corporate strategy that results in value destruction and the effect is confined
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to the sample of single segment firms. This finding is consistent with the argument that single
segment firms lack the benefit of having internal capital markets and the need of financing new
investments diverts resources from their core competencies.
I also separate the joint venture partners into partner firms forming a joint venture as a
non-diversifying strategy and partner firms entering a diversifying strategy. Panel D shows the
excess value based on asset and sales multiplier for the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint
ventures. For this sub-sample, the excess value based on asset multiplier is 0.084 and is
statistically significant at 5% level. One year after the joint venture formation, partnering firms
entering non-diversifying joint ventures are valued at no premium. The decrease in excess value
is statistically significant. This result may be driven by the market perception that the duplication
of one of the activities undertaken by a firm is a risky strategy, as there is a higher probability
that the partnering firm looses proprietary assets through a joint venture formation.
Firms entering diversifying joint ventures are valued at no discount one year before, as
well as one year after the joint venture formation.

The average impact of a diversifying joint

venture formation on the relative valuation of the partnering firm to the industry counterparts is
insignificant. This result is consistent with the view that diversifying joint ventures offer the
benefits of exploiting economies of scale and scope, while avoiding the cost associated with
diversification through an acquisition or a merger.
I further divide the sub-sample of single segment firms entering a joint venture into firms
entering non-diversifying joint ventures and firms entering diversifying joint ventures. The
results of the analysis presented in both panels of Table VII reinforce the argument that market
perceives a non-diversifying joint venture as a risky strategy in terms of the partner firm’s ability
to protect proprietary assets. In the year prior to the joint venture formation, single segment firms
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forming a non-diversifying joint venture are valued at an impressive 13.01% premium. In the
year following the joint venture formation, partnering firms are valued at the industry median.

Table VII
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the joint
ventures formation. The sample consists of 29 single segment firms that initiated a non-diversifying or a diversifying
joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek
(1995). Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. The last row of every panel
reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Single segment firms entering a non-diversifying joint venture
Number of
Excess value based on
observations
asset multiplier

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.115**
(0.049)

29

0.135**
(0.072)

29

Excess value after

-0.001
(0.004)

29

0.079
(- 0.012)

28

Difference

0.017**

0.048**

Panel B: Single segment firms entering a diversifying joint venture
Number of
Excess value based on
observations
asset multiplier

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.047
(0.020)

79

0.116***
(0.071)

78

Excess value after

0.001
(-0.002)

79

-0.008
(- 0.019)

78

Difference

0.121

0.000***

In summary, the change in excess value around joint venture formation indicates that, on
average, these hybrid corporate strategies are value destroying. However the analysis reveals that
the effect is mostly confined to single segment firms, in particular single segment firms entering
a non-diversifying joint venture. The valuation of the multiple segment firms relative to their
industry counterparts is not affected by joint venture formations.
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3.3.5. Joint ventures formation: impact on the efficiency of internal capital markets
The analysis of the impact of joint ventures formation on the efficiency of internal capital
markets requires a further restriction in the sample by eliminating single segment firms. From the
sample of 76 multiple segment firms used for the previous analysis, I exclude 3 firms without
sufficient data at the segment level to calculate at least one of the three proxies of the efficiency
of capital allocation.
Several studies document a positive relationship between change in investment efficiency
and change in excess value around asset sales and spin-offs (Ahn and Denis, 2003; Dittmar and
Shivdasany, 2003; Burch and Nanda, 2003).

Table VIII
This table reports the different measure of the allocation efficiency of the internal capital markets for the year prior
to and the year following the joint ventures formation. The sample consists of 76 multi-segment firms that initiated a
joint venture between 1991 and 1996 with sufficient data to calculate the relative value added by allocation (RVA)
as defined in Rajan and Zingales (2000), q sensitivity of investment as defined in Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and
cash flow sensitivity as defined in Peyer (2002). Median values are reported in parentheses below mean values. The
last row of every panel reports the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in means. *, **, and *** represent
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Relative value added by allocation (RVA)

RVA before

RVA after

p-value

Mean
Median
0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

Number of
observations
73

73

0.804

Panel B: q sensitivity of investment

q sensitivity of investment before

q sensitivity of investment after

p-value

Mean
Median
-0.001
(0.000)

Number of
observations
73

0.012
(0.000)

72

0.613
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(table VIII continued)
Panel C: Cash-flow sensitivity of investment

Cash flow sensitivity of investment before

Cash flow sensitivity of investment after

p-value

Mean
Median
0.005*
(0.000)

Number of
observations
73

0.090
(0.004)

72

0.002***

The results of the analysis presented in Table VIII are consistent with these studies. In the
year prior to joint venture formation, relative value added by allocation, as developed by Rajan,
Servaes, and Zingales (2000) is 0.001, insignificantly different than zero. Multiple segment
partner firms allocate as much capital to segments with above average investment opportunities
as to segment with investment opportunities with below average investment opportunities; hence
the firm have the same investment pattern as single segment industry counterparts in those
segments. There is no significant change in the year following the joint venture formation, as the
difference in means is insignificantly different than zero. This result is reinforced by the analysis
using the q sensitivity of investment as developed by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001). Somehow
different result is provided by the analysis of cash flow sensitivity of investment, a proxy
developed by Peyer (2002). The result indicates that the decrease in investment efficiency is
significant around joint ventures formation. However, cash flow sensitivity of investment is only
marginally significant one year before the joint venture formation, while insignificant one year
after.

3.4. Conclusion
This study provides a re-examination of the market reaction at the announcements of
joint ventures formation. Consistent with the evidence found in prior studies, I document that on
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average, investors perceive these corporate strategies to be value creating. I further show that
joint ventures enhancing value upon announcement can be distinguished from those that do not
create value. I divide joint ventures into diversifying and non-diversifying based on the degree of
overlap of their activity with concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms. The analysis
reveals that non-diversifying joint ventures are value enhancing, while non-diversifying joint
ventures do not destroy value. I also provide evidence that, while there is little anticipation at the
announcements of joint ventures, market fails to fully capitalize the information embedded in the
announcements for the sub-sample of diversifying joint ventures.
I find that non-diversifying joint ventures are less likely to be formed by partner firms
situated in highly concentrated industries, during periods of economic expansion. I also suggest
that technological joint ventures are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying strategies and
that partner firms entering this type of strategy are more willing to accept a minority shareholder
stake in the newly formed entity. Furthermore, the degree of overlap between joint venture
activity and concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms is negatively related to firm’s
age and positively related to its growth opportunities.
I also find that joint ventures formation negatively impact the valuation of partner firms
relative to their industry counterparts. I show that, on average, partnering firms are traded at a
premium before the joint venture formation. At the end of the year following the joint venture
formation the excess value measure is insignificantly different than zero. However, this result
seems to be mostly confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms, specifically to single
segment firms initiating a non-diversifying strategy. For the sub-sample of multiple segment
firms I find no evidence that joint ventures formation significantly impacts the valuation of the
firm or the efficiency of internal capital markets.
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4. Essay 2:
Value Creation through Diversifying versus Non-diversifying Strategic
Alliance Formations
In this essay I test three main hypotheses related to the impact of strategic alliance
formations on partner firms’ valuation. First, I analyze the market reaction at the announcements
of strategic alliances. Second, I analyze internal and external determinants of a strategic alliance
formation as either diversifying or non-diversifying strategy. Third, I examine the impact of
strategic alliance formations on firms’ valuation during the year following the initiation of the
alliance.

4.1. Hypotheses
4.1.1. Market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliance formations
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) document positive market reaction at the
announcement of strategic alliances formed by US firms. Their sample is spanning 1983-1992
and includes 345 strategic alliances. The magnitude of the abnormal returns is a significant
0.64%, and no evidence of wealth transfer between the partners in the alliance was found. Their
results document that the abnormal market reaction is mainly confined to a sub-sample of hightech firms. Further analysis indicates that firms entering horizontal alliances involving transfer or
pooling of technology experienced the highest market reaction (3.54%). They distinguish
between horizontal and vertical alliances based on the difference between the three-digit SIC
code of the partner firms. Non-horizontal alliances with a main objective of entering new
markets experienced a positive abnormal return with a magnitude of 1.45%, while horizontal
non-technical and non-horizontal technical alliances were met with no significant market
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reaction. Finally, Chan et al. (1997) find that firms that form strategic alliances have superior
operating performance relative to their industry counterparts over the five-year period
surrounding the alliance formation year.
Das, Sen and Sengupta (1998) investigate the stock price response to the formation of
119 strategic alliances during the period of 1987 and 1991. They classify strategic alliances into
technological and marketing alliances. Technological alliances incorporate research and
development, technology transfer, and manufacturing, while marketing alliances include
distribution, marketing, and customer service. The abnormal returns documented for the whole
sample are positive and statistically significant. However, the results were mainly driven by the
sub-sample of technological alliances, while marketing alliances had insignificant abnormal
returns.
Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) provide further insight on the market reaction to the
strategic alliance formations by incorporating in the analysis firms’ experience in managing
strategic alliances. As hypothesized, firms with greater alliance experience experienced higher
cumulative abnormal returns than firms without an alliance function. Finally, Kale et al (2002)
shows that market reaction is positively related to benefits provided by the alliance, measured by
managerial assessments and accounting data.
In this study, I distinguish between diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances
based on the degree of overlap between the activity of the alliance (four-digits SIC code) and the
activities developed by the each partner firm. When there is no such an overlap I classify the
alliance formation as a diversifying strategy. Therefore, a strategic alliance formation may be a
diversifying strategy for one of the partner firms and a non-diversifying for the other,
diversifying strategy for both partner firms or non-diversifying for both partner firms. I also
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classify all alliances that have research and development, technology, and manufacturing as
technology alliances and others such as marketing, supply, and licensing agreements, as nontechnology alliances. Based on this classifications and previous empirical evidence, I
hypothesize that:
H1: Strategic alliances formations are met with positive market reaction around the date

of the announcement. Non-diversifying alliances experience a higher market abnormal
return than diversifying alliances.
4.1.2. Firms’ choice of entering diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliances
Firm’s decision to enter a specific strategic alliance is not a random process. Koza and
Lewin (1996) argue that firm’s choice to enter into an alliance can be distinguished in terms of
its motivation to exploit an existing capability or to explore for new opportunities. Next section
derives the hypotheses explaining a firm’s choice of entering a strategic alliance as a diversifying
or a non-diversifying strategy.

i) Strategic position: Baum and Oliver (1991) argue that strategic alliances formed by
firms in highly competitive industries are providing the partner firms with valuable resources
needed to ride out difficult times. Strategic alliances constitute useful arrangement with a
purpose of sharing costs, and thus a useful vehicle to ease profit pressure, which are particularly
intense in highly competitive industries. However, these benefits are more likely to be higher
when strategic alliance is designed as a non-diversifying strategy. Such alliances also help the
partnering firms to distinguish themselves from other competitors. Based on the aforementioned
arguments, I conjecture that:
H2a: Firms in highly competitive industries are more likely to form non-diversifying

strategic alliances.
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ii) Economic conditions: Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) stipulate that: “ strategic
alliance formation is a complex phenomenon involving both strategic and social factors
operating within a logic of needs and opportunities for cooperation”. One of these factors may
also be related to the economic growth/decline at the time of strategic alliance formation. During
economic expansion periods, a firm’s ability to quickly increase its productive capacity brings
the advantage of the first mover, which results in gaining a higher market share. Nondiversifying strategic alliances prove to be a rapid and flexible way of making the necessary
adjustment to resources. Firms are also faced with the decision to expand into other markets, as
periods of economic booms are characterized by new investment opportunities. Diversifying
strategic alliances allows partnering firms to undertake these opportunities, without incurring the
effects of instant integration involved in asset purchases or mergers. Therefore, I argue that:
H2b: Firm’s decision of entering a diversifying or a non-diversifying strategic alliance

during economic upwards is equally motivated.
iii) Technological alliances: According to Hagedoorn (1993), technological strategic
alliances involve cooperation in upstream value chain activities such as R&D, manufacturing and
engineering, whereas non-technological strategic alliances involve cooperation in downstream
value chains as sales and distribution. Similar to technological joint ventures, technological
strategic alliances are subject to severe moral hazard and adverse selection problems because of
the difficulty in assessing the true value of the output. Non-diversifying strategic alliances
partially mitigate these problems, as partner firm has previous experience in that particular line
of business. Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2c: Technological strategic alliances are more likely to be formed as non-diversifying

strategies.
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iv) Firm’s age: Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) investigate the extent to which
interorganizational networks of young companies affect their ability to acquire the resources
necessary for survival and growth. Young firms with high growth opportunities and higher
operating performance, whose quality is good but not easily observable, may enter an alliance to
enhance its visibility to would-be buyers or suppliers. Along the same lines, Allen and Phillips
(2000) and Pablo and Subramaniam (2001) point out that an alliance provides a way to finance
growth opportunities without facing the cost of external finance. Strong relationships with
prominent firms, not necessarily operating in the same industry, convey the positive evaluation
received by young companies from influential organizations. Therefore, a strategic alliance
formation acts as an endorsement of the quality of existing activities developed by the young
partner firm. Firms with strong strategic position within their industries, usually mature firms,
are less likely to form strategic alliances overlapping their existing activities. Their decision to
form a strategic alliance is more likely to be undertaken as a first step of entering new markets
searching for new growth opportunities. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize that:
H2d: Younger firm with high growth opportunities are more likely to form a non-

diversifying strategic alliances, while mature firms with lower growth opportunities are
more likely to form diversifying strategic alliances.
v) Relative efficiency of the focal segment: Another motive driving the firms’ choice of a
non-diversifying alliance formation may be linked to the investment efficiency of the segment
having the same primary SIC code with that of the strategic alliance. If the management wants to
focus the available resources into core activities, and therefore are less willing to invest in
peripheral activities, an alliance involving the peripheral divisions may prove to be helpful
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because partnering firm may provides valuable expertise and possibly necessary resources.
Therefore, I hypothesize that:
H2e: A firm is more likely to form a non-diversifying strategic alliance with a lower

degree of overlap when the investment ratio of the focal segment is low.
vi) Change in Excess Value around Strategic Alliance Formation: The strategic behavior theory
of Kogut (1988) and Jarillo (1989) suggests that firms enter strategic alliances because of longterm strategic consideration, regardless of immediate cost-benefit consideration. Therefore, a
strategic alliance that is valuable in the long run need not have a short-term net benefit9. Khanna
(1998) identifies sources of benefit that accrue to partnering firms entering a strategic alliance.
He defines private benefits, as those that accrue to subsets of participants in an alliance while
common benefits are defined as those that accrue collectively to all participants. Private benefits
are more likely to be appropriated by the leading firm, the partnering firm with the highest
investment made in the alliance. He further argues that the degree of overlap between the
alliance scope and the scope of the firm determines the amount of resources invested in the
alliance. Therefore, firms entering non-diversifying strategic alliances are more likely to further
increase their investment immediately after the alliance formation. However, the necessary
resources are part of the broader range of resources available to other existing activities
developed by firm but not governed by the alliance. Hence, partnering firms trying to derive
higher private benefits from the alliance may need to fall back on their internal capital markets to
finance sequential investments immediately after the alliance formation. However, an efficient
internal capital market may be used to transfer resources from segments with low growth

9

Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that firms that enter a strategic alliance tend to outperform their
industry counterparts when performance measures are considered over an interval of five years around the alliance
formation, but perform similarly when performance is measured from the year before to the year after the alliance
formation.
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opportunities to a better use offered by the strategic alliance. Single segment firms are more
likely to be negatively affected, as they lack the flexibility provided by internal capital markets.
Market participants may penalize a single segment firm’s decision to redistribute the limited
resources between the only activity developed in the house and strategic alliance. Thus,
hypothesis 5 is stated as follows:
H3: There is a negative impact of a strategic alliance on the valuation of the partner firm

relative to its industry counterparts. This effect is more likely to be confined to the subsample of single segment firms.
4.2. Variables Definitions and Methodology
In this section, I define the variables and describe the methodology used to test the
hypotheses.

4.2.1. Market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliances
I examine the wealth effects of strategic alliances formation by employing the eventstudy methodology used by Dodd and Warner (1983). I estimate a market model over 155-day
period ending 45 days before the announcement of the alliance. I perform the analysis for the
whole sample and for the sub-samples of diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances. I
classify a strategic alliance as a diversifying corporate strategy when none of partner’s business
segments share the same four digits SIC code with the primary SIC of the strategic alliance.
Similarly, a non-diversifying strategic alliance implies that at least one of the business segments
of the partner firm share the same SIC code with that of the strategic alliance. Figure 1 illustrates
one example of strategic alliance formation as a diversifying strategy for one of the partners and
non-diversifying for the other partner. On January 1st, 1992 Parametric Technology Corp and the
Flight system division of United Technology Corp signed an agreement to jointly develop
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Parametric’s Pro/ Composite CAE application for automated design and manufacture of
composite parts. There is a perfect overlap between the SIC code of the strategic alliance and the
SIC code of the Mechanical design software business segment of the Parametric Technology
Corp. None of the United Technology Corp business segments share the same SIC code with the
strategic alliance. Therefore, I classify this strategic alliance as a diversifying strategy for United
Technology Corp and as a non-diversifying strategy for Parametric Technology Corp.

Figure 1
Strategic alliance as a Diversifying versus Non-diversifying Strategy
Parent firm 1
UNITED TECHNOLOGY CORP
(SIC code 3724)

Parent firm 2
PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP
(SIC code 7372)

Strategic Alliance
(SIC code 7372)
UNITED TECHNOLOGY CORP
Business segments

Strategic Alliance

SIC code

SIC code

Power

3724

7372

Automotive

3714

Flight system

3721

Building systems

3534

Other

3674

PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP
Business segments

SIC code

Mechanical design Software

7372

4.2.2. Firm’s choice of entering a strategic alliance as diversifying or non-diversifying
strategy
In order to test hypotheses H2a through H2e, I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage
selection model10. The main variables used in the analysis are as follows: a) Herfindahl-

10

A detailed description of Heckman two-stage model is presented in Section 3.2.2. of this dissertation
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N

Hirschman Index measured as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index=

∑α

2
i

, where α i represents the

i =1

market share of firm i within an industry with N firms; b) Technology dummy that takes value 1
if the contract specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product
development; c) GDP is the real growth on the Gross Domestic Product; d) Size defined as the
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm; e) Segment investment ratio is defined as the
ratio of capital expenditures to total sales of the focal segment, i.e business segment sharing the
same primary SIC code with the strategic alliance ; f) a growth indicator dummy set to 1 when
market-to-book market to book ratio of the firm is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise; g) Cash flow
from operations is cash flow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio
relative to the total assets of the firm; h) Operating return on assets is operating income before
depreciation divided by total assets. Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), I use the
ratio of the firms’ market value of assets to book value of assets as a proxy for growth options in
the firm’s investment opportunity set. Market value equals the book value of assets minus the
book value of equity plus the market value of equity.

4.2.3. Measure of relative valuation
In measuring the relative valuation of the partner firms I use the excess value metrics, as
initially developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), which compares a firm’s value to its imputed
value of each of its segments operated as a single segment firms. For each firm, segments are
valued using median industry asset and sales multipliers of single segment firms. The imputed
value of the firm is the sum of the segment values. Excess value is calculated as the logarithm of
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the ratio of firm value to imputed value11. Positive excess value indicates that the firm trades at a
premium, while negative values are indicative of a premium.

4.3. Results
4.3.1. Data and summary statistics
Using a sample spanning 1991-2000, I examine the market reaction at the announcements
of strategic alliances formation, the main determinants of a firm’s choice to form strategic
alliances as a diversifying and non-diversifying strategy and whether strategic alliances
formation favorably affects the valuation of the partner firms relative to their industry
counterparts. The list of strategic alliances comes from Thompson Financial Security database
(SDC- Joint Ventures/Alliances). In order to test H1 through H2e, I select only strategic alliances
formed by two publicly traded US firms with available financial data on Compustat both at the
firm and business segment level for the year prior to strategic alliance formation. I start with an
initial sample of 3106 strategic alliances formed by two publicly traded industrial partner firms. I
select only those strategic alliances where both partnering firms have financial data on the
Compustat Industry Segment file one year before the alliance formation. This leaves a total of
1637 strategic alliances initiated by 3274 partner firms between 1991 and 2000.
Table I presents the annual distribution of the strategic alliances. The minimum number
of strategic alliances formations in the sample is 29 during the year of 1991, involving 58 firms,
and the maximum number is 292 during the year of 1997, involving 584 firms. Within the same
year there is a similar percentage of non-diversifying and diversifying strategic alliances out of
the total for each sub-sample.

11

For a detailed description of the excess value measure see Section 3.2.3
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Table I
The industry refers to the industry of the alliance, i.e. the primary SIC code of the alliance. The sample consists on
2489 firms that initiate diversifying strategic alliances and 785 firms that initiate non-diversifying strategic alliances
between 01/01/91 and 12/31/00. All deals are identified using the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Joint Ventures
and Alliances database.
Panel A: Number of parent firms by year
Diversifying SA
Non-Diversifying SA
Year
1991

Number
9

%
0.01

Number
49

%
0.02

1992

77

9.81

299

12.01

1993

72

9.17

290

11.65

1994

95

12.10

289

11.61

1995

106

13.50

314

12.62

1996

102

12.99

254

10.20

1997

160

20.38

424

17.03

1998

70

8.92

208

8.36

1999

64

8.15

250

10.04

2000

30

3.82

112

4.50

785

100

2489

100

Total number of firms
Panel B: Parent firms by industry

Diversifying SA

Non-Diversifying SA
SIC
0

Sector
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

1

Mining and Construction

2

Number

%

Number

%

0

0

5

0.20

5

0.64

15

0.60

Manufacturing

110

14.01

437

17.56

3

Manufacturing

199

25.35

1074

43.15

4

Transportation and Communication

34

4.33

138

5.54

5

Wholesale and Retail Trade

26

3.31

118

4.74

7

Lodging and Entertainment

405

51.59

666

26.76

8

Services

5

0.64

32

1.29

9

Public Administration

1

0.13

4

0.16

785

100

2489

100

All sectors
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(table I continued)
Panel C: Alliances by industry
Diversifying SA

Non-Diversifying SA
SIC
0

Sector
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

1

Mining and Construction

2

Number

%

Number

%

0

0

6

0.24

6

0.76

12

0.48

Manufacturing

106

13.5

272

10.93

3

Manufacturing

199

25.35

639

25.67

4

Transportation and Communication

32

4.08

96

3.86

5

Wholesale and Retail Trade

31

3.95

495

19.85

7

Lodging and Entertainment

406

51.72

786

31.62

8

Services

5

0.64

149

5.99

9

Public Administration

0

0

34

1.37

785

100

2489

100

All sectors

Panel B shows the industry distribution of the partner firms. There is a high
representation of manufacturing and lodging and entertainment firms, accounting for almost 72%
of the total sample. Similar distribution is shown in Panel C, where the difference between
partner firms is made based on the industry of the alliance.
Table II presents data descriptive for partner firms entering diversifying and nondiversifying strategic alliances. Firms entering diversifying strategic alliances are on average
more mature, have a lower market to book ratio, and a higher debt ratio than firms entering nondiversifying strategic alliances. The difference in research and development ratio is also
significantly different from zero at 1% level, indicating that firms forming a non-diversifying
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strategic alliance are more research intensive than those forming diversifying strategic
alliances.12

Table II
The sample consists on 2489 firms that initiate diversifying strategic alliances and 785 firms that initiate nondiversifying strategic alliances. Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm. Market to book ratio is
the ratio of the market value to the book value of assets. Research and development is equal to research and
development expenditures divided by book value of assets. Debt ratio is defined as debt over book value of assets
where debt is the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated
from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating return on
assets is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Herfindahl Index is calculated as Herfindahl
N

Index= ∑ α i2 where α i represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N firms. The last column
i =1

shows the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the Median Two-Sample test. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Non-diversifying
Strategic alliances

Diversifying
Strategic alliances

p-value

Size

5.958
(5.789)

6.772
(6.807)

0.000***
0.000***

Market to Book

5.217
(3.052)

3.857
(2.264)

0.000***
0.000***

Research and Development

0.161
(0.128)

0.132
(0.103)

0.000***
0.000***

Debt ratio

0.122
(0.044)

0.158
(0.117)

0.000***
0.000***

Cash flow from Operating Activities

0.061
(0.105)

0.043
(0.149)

0.000***
0.022**

Operating return on assets

0.097
(0.156)

0.086
(0.088)

0.007***
0.187

Herfindahl Index

0.144
(0.062)

0.236
(0.186)

0.000***
0.000***

Number of firms

785

2489

12

Firms are required to report research and development expenses when they exceed 1% of the total sales.
Following Campa and Kedia (2003), I replace all the missing observations with zero and compute the means for the
two sub-samples. The difference remains statistically significant at the conventional levels.
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The statistical significant difference in Herfindahl–Hirschman index variable indicates
that partner firms forming diversifying strategic alliances are from industries with a higher
concentration than those forming non-diversifying strategic alliances. Although not reported in
the table, the analysis indicates that the percentage of technological non-diversifying strategic
alliances is higher than the percentage of technological diversifying strategic alliances.

4.3.2. Market reaction around the announcement of strategic alliance formations
I investigate the market abnormal return for the sample of firms entering strategic
alliances, and I present the results for the two sub-samples of diversifying and non-diversifying
strategic alliances. I further divide the diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances in
technological and non-technological sub-samples. Consistent with the main prediction of
hypothesis H1, I find statistical significant positive abnormal returns for the whole sample.
Table III summarizes the abnormal returns over different time intervals around the date
of the announcement. I obtain a significant mean two –day cumulative abnormal return of 1.16%
for the event window (-1, 0), and a significant mean three-day abnormal return of 0.99 % for the
event window (-1, +1). Consistent with predictions made by Hypothesis H1, Panel B and C show
that the market reaction is higher at the announcements of non-diversifying strategic alliances
than at the announcements of diversifying strategic alliances. The analysis of the market reaction
for the sub-samples of technological alliances reveals that most of the positive market reaction is
confined to non-diversifying technological strategic alliances. This result is consistent with the
evidence presented by Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) and Das, Sen and Sengupta
(1998).
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Table III
Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 3274 firms that announced strategic alliances
formation during the period 1991-2000. The sample consists on 785 firms that initiate diversifying strategic
alliances and 2489 firms that initiate non-diversifying strategic alliances. Strategic alliances are identified from the
SDC database. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period
ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to
compute betas. The abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio of the
number of firms with positive abnormal returns to the total number of firms. The Wilcoxon rank test is used to test
the statistical significance of median abnormal returns. $, *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, and
0.1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: All Parent firms
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
1.16

Median
0.64

z-statistic
9.73***

Wilcoxon rank test
3.814***

-1 to +1

0.99

0.54

6.69***

2.107**

-20 to +5

0.76

0.39

1.65*

-2.882

Panel B: Parent firms for diversifying strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
0.90

Median
0.21

z-statistic
6.89***

Wilcoxon rank test
3.287***

-1 to +1

0.69

0.13

4.03***

1.313*

-20 to +5

0.63

0.32

0.91

-2.978

Panel C: Parent firms for non-diversifying strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
1.98

Median
0.50

z-statistic
7.58***

Wilcoxon rank test
2.888***

-1 to +1

1.97

0.72

6.47***

2.608***

-20 to +5

1.15

0.67

1.74*

-1.189

Panel D: Parent firms for non-diversifying, non-technological strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
0.97

Median
0.39

z-statistic
2.043**

Wilcoxon rank test
0.130

-1 to +1

1.37

0.52

3.038***

0.759

-20 to +5

-0.53

-0.29

0.896

-1.389

69
(table III continued)
Panel E: Parent firms for non-diversifying, technological strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
2.48

Median
0.55

z-statistic
7.589***

Wilcoxon rank test
3.641***

-1 to +1

2.26

0.84

5.780***

2.880***

-20 to +5

1.99

0.96

1.501*

-0.649

Panel F: Parent firms for diversifying, non- technological strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
0.70

Median
0.22

z-statistic
3.742***

Wilcoxon rank test
2.443***

-1 to +1

0.53

0.23

2.298***

1.110

-20 to +5

0.81

0.68

0.694

-1.718

Panel G: Parent firms for diversifying, technological strategic alliances
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for the sample

-1 to 0

Mean%
1.07

Median
0.19

z-statistic
5.913***

Wilcoxon rank test
2.639***

-1 to +1

0.82

0.08

3.366***

0.949

-20 to +5

0.49

0.09

0.364

-2.777

4.3.3. Firm’s choice between diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliance
Table IV presents the results of the analysis of the firms’ choice of a diversifying or nondiversifying strategic alliance. Furthermore, given the choice of a non-diversifying strategic
alliance the analysis presents the main determinants of the degree of overlap between the
strategic alliance activity and existing activities developed in the house by the partner firm. I
conduct this analysis by using Heckman two-stage model.
The dependent variable for the probit model (selection model) is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 for partner firms forming non-diversifying strategic alliances and 0 otherwise.
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Table IV
The dependent variable in the selection model is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for non-diversifying strategic
alliances and 0 otherwise. On the second and third column, the dependent variable is the degree of overlap of the
strategic alliance with one of the existing segments of the parent firm. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as
N

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index= ∑ α i2 , where α i represents the market share of firm i within an industry with N
i =1

firms. GDP is the real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. Technology dummy takes value 1 if the contract
specifies either one or a combination of R&D, technology or product development and 0 otherwise. Size is the
natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm. Cash flow from operations is cash flow generated from all operating
activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating return on assets is operating
income before depreciation divided by total assets. The growth dummy is an indicator variable, which is one if the
firm is high-growth, and 0 otherwise. Segment investment ratio is defined as capital expenditures at segment level
divided by total sales of the segment and is calculated for the segment that has the same SIC code with the that of
the strategic alliance. Number of segments represents the number of segments of the parent firm. *, **, and ***
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
Predicted sign
Selection model (1)
Substantial analysis (1)
Regressions
Constant

Herfindahl Index

GDP

-0.356
(0.01)
-

+/-

1.192
(0.00)

-1.696***
(0.00)
4.826
(0.10)

Technology dummy

+

1.294***
(0.00)

Size

-

-0.074***
(0.00)

-0.010***
(0.00)

Cash flow form operations

+

0.434***
(0.00)

0.024
(0.39)

Growth dummy

+

0.121**
(0.02)

0.015
(0.26)

Segment investment ratio

+

0.001**
(0.04)

Number of segments

-

-0.092**
(0.01)

LAMBDA
Total effect of age
Total effect of Cash flow
Total effect of Growth dummy
Number of firms

3274

-0.071**
(0.01)
-0.013
(0.11)
0.044
(0.57)
0.020
(0.57)
785
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(table IV continued)
PANEL B
Regressions

Predicted sign

Constant

Herfindahl Index

GDP

-

+/-

Selection model (2)

Substantial analysis (2)

-0.394
(0.00)

1.192
(0.00)

-1.734***
(0.00)
4.877*
(0.09)

Technology dummy

+

1.292***
(0.00)

Size

-

-0.066***
(0.00)

-0.009***
(0.00)

Operating return on assets

+

0.261**
(0.01)

0.022
(0.38)

Growth dummy

+

0.120**
(0.02)

0.015
(0.26)

Segment investment ratio

+

0.001**
(0.04)

Number of segments

-

-0.093**
(0.01)

LAMBDA
Total effect of age
Total effect of Operating return
Total effect of Growth dummy
Number of firms

3274

0.072**
(0.01)
-0.012
(0.11)
0.033
(0.62)
0.020
(0.56)
785

The dependent variable at the second stage (the OLS analysis) is the degree of overlap
between strategic alliance activity (four digits SIC code) and the activity of existing business
segments. The degree of overlap is defined as the ratio of the sale of the focal business segment
(the segment with the same SIC code as the primary SIC of the strategic alliance) and the total
sales at the firm level. The results at the selection level model indicate that firms in highly
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competitive industries are willing to form non-diversifying strategic alliances in order to
preserves their market share. The coefficient of GDP is positive but marginally significant,
indicating that diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances are equally likely to be
formed during economic expansion. The results also indicate that technological strategic
alliances are more likely to be formed as a non-diversifying strategy in order to minimize the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The coefficients of growth dummy and cash flow
from operations are positive, and the coefficient of size is negative, indicating that young
companies forming non-diversifying strategic alliances are trading growth opportunities and a
relatively superior financial position for market recognition. The analysis reveals remains
unchanged when operating return on assets is used instead of cash flow from operations.
Substantial analysis indicates that size, growth opportunities and performance measures
are not related to the degree of overlap between the alliance activity and the existing activities.
Consistent with hypothesis H2e, the coefficient of the segment investment ratio of the focal
segment has the predicted sign and is highly significant at the conventional levels. This result
indicates that the degree of overlap is positively related to the investment ratio. Therefore,
partially consistent with Stopford and Wells (1972), my result indicates that strategic alliances
overlapping peripheral segments duplicate business segments in which the management has
made low level of investment. The coefficient of Lambda is statistically significant than zero in
both analyses.

4.3.4. Changes in excess value around strategic alliance formation
The sample used to test hypotheses H3 is constructed using a multiple-stage process. I
start with the sub-sample of 1956 publicly traded partner firms forming strategic alliances during
1991-1997. First, I exclude firms that do not have financial data available on Compustat, both at
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the firm and segment level, one year after the strategic alliance formation. I exclude any firm that
have at least one financial segment or when one of its business segments is not assigned an SIC.
Second, following the convention in the literature, I exclude any firms where the sum of
divisional assets deviates by more than 25% of the firm total assets. This sample cleaning
process results in 898 firms. The restriction of the sample for the period during 1991 and 1997 is
motivated by the change In 1997 the Securities and Exchange Committee adopted the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards 131 (SFAS 131) that replaced SFAS 1413.

Table V
This table reports excess value based on asset multiplier for the year prior to and the year following the strategic
alliance formation. The sample consists of 898 firms that initiated a strategic alliance between 1991 and 1996 with
sufficient data to calculate excess value as defined in Berger and Ofek (1995). Panel A reports results for the full
sample. Panel B and C examine sub-samples. The last row of every panel reports the p-value for the Wilcoxon ranksum test for the difference in means. . *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: All Partner firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.082***
(0.053)

898

0.164***
(0.103)

898

Excess value after

0.039***
(0.011)

898

0.057***
(0.017)

898

Difference

0.000***

0.000***

Panel B: Single segment firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.088***
(0.061)

784

0.205***
(0.151)

784

Excess value after

0.041***
(0.007)

784

0.083***
(0.036)

784

Difference

0.000***

13

0.000***

Detailed description of SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-7549.htm
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(table V continued)
Panel C: Multiple segment firms
Excess value based on
asset multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value based
on sale multiplier

Number of
observations

Excess value before

0.042
(0.018)

114

-0.114***
(0.122)

114

Excess value after

0.022
(0.021)

114

-0.120***
(0.101)

114

Difference

0.445

0.000***

Table V presents the mean and median excess value based on asset and sales multiplier of
the partner firms in the year before and the year after strategic alliance formation. The mean
excess value before strategic alliance formation is a statistically significant 0.082 based on asset
multiplier and 0.164 based on sales multiplier. Therefore, the partner firms in my sample are
valued at 20.78% above the imputed value based on asset multiplier, and 45.88% above the
imputed value based on sales multiplier. In the year following the strategic alliance formation,
the average excess value is a statistically significant 0.039 based on asset multiplier and 0.057
for sales multiplier. I perform a similar analysis for the two sub-samples of single segment and
multiple segment firms. The analysis indicates that the premium documented before the strategic
alliance formation for the whole sample is confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms.
Single segment firms forming strategic alliances are traded at a premium of almost 15% before
the strategic alliance formation and 11% after the alliance formation. The decrease in excess
value for this sub-sample is statistically significant and indicates that single segment firms are
negatively affected by the lack of having an efficient internal capital market. In contrast, the
excess value measure for the multiple segment firms is statistically indistinguishable from zero,
both before and after the alliance formation. On one hand, no change in excess value for multiple
segment firms may reflect the fact that strategic alliance formation is a step further in
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maintaining a relatively good valuation compared to industry counterparts. On the other hand,
one should consider the size of the investment required for the strategic alliance as compared to
the size of the partner firm that initiates it. It may also be the case that, on average, required
investment for strategic alliance initiation is smaller than other types of investment undertaken
by a multiple segment firm.
The analysis of the change in excess value calculated using sales multiplier shows that
single segment firms are traded at an impressive premium, both before and after the year of
alliance formation, while multiple segment firms are traded at a discount. However, the decrease
in excess value based on sales multiplier is statistically significant only for single segment firms.
My results support the evidence presented by Berger and Ofek (1995). In their study, the excess
value of the single segment firms is higher than the excess value of the multiple segment firms.
However, the magnitude of the excess value that I document for the sample of partnering firms is
higher, both for diversifying and non-diversifying strategic alliances
In summary, the change in excess value around strategic alliance formation indicates that
the potential long-term benefit expected from the alliance comes at an immediate cost, which
results in value destruction. However, the analysis reveals that the effect is mostly confined to
single segment firms. The valuation of the multiple segment firms relative to their industry
counterparts is not affected by strategic alliance formations.

4.4. Conclusion
This study analyses the market reaction at the announcements of strategic alliances
formation. Consistent with previous findings, I document that on average, investors perceive
these corporate strategies to be value creating. I divide strategic alliances into diversifying and
non-diversifying based on the degree of overlap of their activity with concurrent activities
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undertaken by the partner firms, and further for each of the two sub-samples in distinguish
between technological and non-technological strategic alliances. The analysis reveals that most
of the positive abnormal returns are confined to the sub-sample of technological non-diversifying
strategic alliances.
I find that diversifying strategic alliances are less likely to be formed by younger firms
with high growth opportunities and good operating performance, situated in highly competitive
industries. I also suggest that technological strategic alliances are more likely to be formed as
non-diversifying strategies. Furthermore, the degree of overlap between strategic alliance activity
and concurrent activities undertaken by the partner firms is positively related to the investment
ratio of the focal segment.
I also find that strategic alliances formation negatively impact the valuation of partner
firms relative to their industry counterparts. However, this result seems to be mostly confined to
the sub-sample of single segment firms.
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5. Concluding Remarks
This study analyses the market reaction at the announcements of alliances formation,
firm’s choice of entering an alliance as a diversifying or non-diversifying strategy and the
immediate impact of the alliance formation on the valuation of the partnering firms relative to
their industry counterparts.
In Chapter 3, I conduct the analysis on a sample of publicly traded firms initiating 239
joint ventures between 1991and 1999. Consistent with previous evidence in the literature, I find
that joint venture announcements are met, on average, with a positive market reaction. The
results also indicate that joint ventures creating value upon announcements can be distinguished
from those that do not create value. The positive wealth effect around the announcements is
confined to the sub-sample of non-diversifying joint ventures.
I also show that a firm’s decision to enter a joint venture designed as a diversifying or a
non-diversifying strategy is motivated by the interaction of industry- and firm-specific factors.
Non-diversifying joint ventures are more likely to be formed by firms operating in highly
competitive industries, during economic downturns, and are designed as appropriate strategies
for complex joint ventures. The degree of overlap between the joint venture activity and existing
activities developed by the partnering firm is higher for younger firms and for firms with higher
growth opportunities.
I also analyze the short run impact of joint venture formation on the valuation of the
partnering firms. I use a sample of 184 publicly traded firms initiating a joint venture between
1991 and 1996. I document that the joint venture formations negatively impacts the valuation of
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the partnering firms, and the effect is confined to the sub-sample of single segment firms. I
further show that for the sub-samples of multiple segment firms there is no significant change in
the excess value around the joint venture formations. Moreover, the efficiency of capital
allocation across different segments remains unaltered after the joint venture formation.
The focus of Chapter 4 is the analysis of three major hypotheses for a sample of firms
forming strategic alliances. The first hypothesis predicts that, on average, market participants
perceive strategic alliances as value creating corporate events. Within the second set of
hypotheses I make predictions about the impact of various factors on a firm’s choice of forming
a diversifying or non-diversifying strategic alliance.
I conduct my analysis using a sample of 1,638 strategic alliances formed between 1991
and 2000 by publicly traded industrial firms. The magnitude of the market reaction at the
announcements of strategic alliance formation is comparable with previous evidence documented
in the literature. My results also support the argument that the highest price reaction is confined
to partner firms entering technological, non-diversifying strategic alliances.
The results of the analysis of the second set of hypotheses reveal that a firms’ decision to
enter a strategic alliance, designed as either a diversifying or a non-diversifying strategy, is a
result of a complex interaction of external conditions and internal needs. Non-diversifying
alliances are mainly formed by partnering firms positioned in highly competitive industries,
during periods of recession, and are designed as the appropriate strategy for complex alliances.
Consistent with learning argument, the degree of overlap between the activity of the strategic
alliance and the existing activities developed in the house in determined by relative efficiency of
the focal segments.
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In Chapter 4 I also study the short-term impact of strategic alliances formation on the
valuation of the partnering firms relative to their industry counterparts. Using a sample of 898
firms initiating strategic alliances between 1991 and 1996, I document that potential long-term
benefit provided by strategic alliances comes at an immediate cost incurred during the year
following the alliance formation. The negative effect is exclusively confined to the sub-sample of
single segment firms.
In summary, this study shows that alliances formation, as hybrid forms of governance, is
a result of an interaction of external factors and internal conditions. Market participants have the
ability to distinguish between alliances that create value and those that do not create value. The
decrease in the valuation of the partner firms after the alliance formation demonstrates that the
long-term benefits provided by entering an alliance comes at an immediate cost.
A possible direction for future research would be the extension of the analysis presented
in this manuscript to the cross-border alliances. Future research in this area should also focus on
the examination of different financial arrangements made by partnering firms in raising the
necessary capital at the initiation and throughout the life of the alliance.
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